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Note
The "Tragedy of the Commons" in Plant
Genetic Resources: The Need for a New
International Regime Centered Around an
International Biotechnology Patent Office
Chetan Gulati-
The last several centuries have seen a transformation in the ways in
which wealth is generated. As society has transformed itself in the post-
industrial era, "knowledge" and "information," as opposed to land and
physical property, have increasingly become the primary sources of wealth
generation.1 For example, historically, it was ownership of the forest that
was the principal channel for the derivation of riches. Today it is the
possession of the patent in the pharmaceutical product derived from the
leaves of the trees of the very same forest that is the fountain from which
the greatest wealth springs. It is not surprising, therefore, that the strategy
of wealth maximization has shifted from the desire to accumulate physical
property to one in which the domination of intellectual property rights
("IPRs") has become preeminent.
2
As already alluded to, the products derived from plant genetic
resources ("PGRs")3 are major sources of wealth generation for developed
t J.D., Yale Law School, expected 2002. I am grateful to Professor Gideon Parchomovsky
for his guidance and valuable commentary. I should also thank my colleagues at the Yale
Law School, especially Saema Somalya, Jean Tom and the other editors of the Yale Human
Rights and Development Law Journal, without whose constant challenge to my ideas, this
project would never have come to fruition.
1. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: THE NEW ENCLOSURES? 4-5 (2000).
2. See generally id. at 164-67.
3. "[PGRs are the] genetic information found in the chromosomes of the nucleus and
associated subcellular structures [of plants]." H. Garrison Wilkes, Comment, Plant Genetic
Resources Over Ten Thousand Years: From a Handful of Seed to the Crop-Specific Mega-Gene Banks,
in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 67, 79 (Jack
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countries. Over the last several decades, the economic value of these PGRs
has risen tremendously.' It is a basic principle of property law that as the
economic value of property increases, it is less likely to be destroyed.
However, this is not true of PGRs. In fact, in the last several decades the
destruction of PGRs, rather than ceasing, has actually accelerated.5 If PGRs
are the source of great wealth, why are they being destroyed? The answer
is rather simple-those who have physical dominion (and thus decide
whether the PGRs are conserved or consumed), are, by in large, not those
who profit from their conservation.
In the current international legal regime, Lesser Developed Countries
("LDCs"), in which most of the PGRs are housed, only collect the rents
from the destruction of PGRs-what I will refer to as "consumption." 7 It is
Developed Countries ("DCs") that profit most from the preservation of
these resources-"conservation." 9  This divide is a product of the
combination of the treatment of "raw genetic resources" in international
law as the "common heritage of mankind,"" or as global public goods, and
the international intellectual property ("IP") regime that treats the products
derived therefrom as private property. Global public goods are distinct
from private goods in that those who consume them do not have to pay for
their use." Thus, like other global public goods, PGRs have suffered what
property law scholars have termed "the tragedy of the commons."12 The
R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988).
4. See, e.g., Mary Parlange, Eco-nomics, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 6, 1999, at 42 ("Consumers in
the US spend at least $6 billion each year on medicines originally derived from tropical
plants.").
5. See, e.g., ANNE BECHER, BIODIVERs1TY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 22 (1998) ("[Elven the
most conservative estimates indicate that we are in the midst of a crisis on the order of the
great prehistoric extinctions.").
6. "Countries that do not have extensive infrastructure, capital and natural resource
development." Mark Harming, An Examination of the Possibility to Secure Intellectual Property
Rights for Plant Genetic Resources Developed by Indigenous Peoples of the NAFTA States: Domestic
Legislation Under the International Convention for Protection of New Plant Varieties, 13 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 175, 182-83 (1996).
7. By "consumption," I mean all of those activities, such as logging and industrial
development, that require the destruction of PGRs.
8. Countries that have well established infrastructures and strong capital reserves.
9. The industries that derive commercial profit from the conservation of PGRs are those
that use the PGRs to develop commercially valuable products, or "end products."
10. The use of the phrase the "common heritage of mankind" is usually traced to the FAO
Undertaking. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
11. Other examples of global public goods are oxygen and the oceans. See Christopher D.
Stone, What to do About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public Goods, and the Earth's Biological
Riches, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 577, 580 (1995). Genetic resources are treated as public goods, but
unlike oceans and oxygen, they are not pure public goods. As this Note hopes to demonstrate,
there are principled ways in which these goods can be treated as property and their rights can
be vested in owners. See infra Part IV. The same is not true for pure public goods such as
oxygen and oceans, whose use is nonexcludable.
12. See, e.g., James 0. Odek, Bio-Piracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic
Resources, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 141,149 (1994) ("[Plant resources] are considered a common
heritage of mankind .... This approach leaves plant genetic resources in a jurisprudential void,
unprotected by private property rights and freely accessible to all."); Lakshmi Sarma, Note,
Biopiracy: Twentieth Century Imperialism in the Form of International Agreements 13 TEMP. INT'L &
Comp. L.J. 107, 114 (1999) ("[Tlransnational corporations ... take plant genetic resources from
2
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tragedy "is the situation in which unowned and unmanaged common
resources are available to all, with the consequence that entrants crowd
onto these resources, overusing them and underinvesting in their
maintenance and improvement." 3
If conservation of PGRs did not impose a cost upon the host country,
treating them as global public goods would not necessarily lead to their
destruction. In point of fact, however, the conservation of PGRs requires
host countries to forego the profits that can be derived from consumption
strategies such as logging." It is no surprise, therefore, that LDCs continue
to consume, rather than conserve. While DCs are not shy about
condemning LDCs for their destruction of biodiversity, they are also the
principal architects of an international regime in which this destruction is
the most attractive economic option available to LDCs. The "international
regime" to which I primarily allude is the IP regime which grants property
rights in the products derived from PGRs to industrialists in DCs and
grants LDCs no similar right.
A review of the various arguments made by both DCs and LDCs
reveals two basic points of view. On one hand, there is the compelling
positive argument that granting property rights to industrialists is a
prerequisite to valuable innovation and these inventions ultimately help
everyone. Equally gripping is the normative contention that the system is
inequitable in that LDCs, who are the sources of PGRs, are being pillaged.
None of this is new. My purpose in writing this Note is not to further
illuminate the battle lines, nor is it to come up with the argument that
finally settles the score in the contest between the normativists and
positivists. Too many others have put their pens to that endeavor. While
my normative preferences are rather evident, I write here as a pragmatist.
My goal is to elaborate a structural proposal that is empirically realizable
and also results in a world that is normatively superior. My proposal has
at its core the premise that both LDCs who house PGRs and DCs whose
industrialists develop commercial products from them, should have
property rights and "get their fair share." There are two strands to the
argument. The theoretical one draws upon the work of legal scholar Carol
Rose and posits that PGRs should be treated as Limited Common Property
("LCP") rather than global public goods. LCP is "property held as
commons amongst the members of a group, but exclusively vis-A-vis the
these communities for free.");. But see Michael J. Huff, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery
Research: A Question of Intellectual Property Rights, 89 Nw. U.L. REv. 1678, 1685 (1995) (noting
that some governments are proposing and enacting domestic legislation to restrict access to
their genetic resources unless a compensation agreement has been reached). It is unclear
whether these domestic laws will be treated as trade barriers under TRIPs, a treaty which will
be discussed more fully in Part I. See infra note 49, for a discussion of possible WTO sanctions
against these countries.
13. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129, 129 (1998).
14. International law does recognize a nation-state's property right in "hard resources"--
the actual trees and plants. See Stone, supra note 11, at 590 (noting that state sovereignty over
internal resources is "entrenched in international law").
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outside world."15 The second, structural, strand has at its core the proposal
that an International Biotechnology Patent Office ("IBPO") to which all
patent applications for products derived from PGRs, from around the
world, are referred, be created for the explicit purpose of granting
industrialists patents in commercial products on the condition that part of
the revenues be distributed to the governments of the LDCs from which
the PGRs were derived. In elaborating my proposal I aspire to fill what I
perceive to be a rather sizeable lacuna in the scholarship and to
simultaneously shift the dialogue away from the normativist vs. positivist
debate towards a conversation focused on potential solutions that will both
aid in the development of LDCs and maintain incentives for innovation.
This Note is divided into six Parts. Part I sets forth the normative case
for changing the status quo regime. Part II considers in detail bio-
prospecting and the ways in which the status quo allocates the rents of
conservation and consumption. The discussion evaluates the existing
international legal regime with particular emphasis on the role of IP law.
Part III explores the reasons why the status-quo regime is both ineffective
and inefficient. Part IV develops the IBPO model in detail. Part V evaluates
other proposals that have been forwarded in the scholarship and defends
the IBPO model as a superior policy option for both LDCs and DCs.
Finally, Part VI defends the proposal for the IBPO as creating a regime that
is normatively superior to the one that currently exists.
I. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR CHANGE
Any attempt to propose structural policy changes to the status quo
must first grapple with the all-important question, why change? As
alluded to in the introduction, I propose a dual response to this macro-
question, one based on the inefficiency of the status quo and the other on
its normative undesirability. I begin in this Part by setting forth the second
prong.
The current international regime raises significant issues relating to the
human rights of indigenous communities. Some suggest that the regime
retards the long-term development of LDCs by forcing their hand into
consumption rather than conservation strategies.16 These authors note that
his reflects a manifestation of the desire to control access to wealth; a
strong motivating force in industrialized economies. 7 Referring to the
current international system, Professor James Boyle notes: "[I1f one has the
slightest concern for distributional justice in one's criteria for property
regimes, this regime must surely fail.""' As it stands, corporations from
15. Rose, supra note 13, at 132.
16. See infra notes 112-20 for an explanation for why the status quo "forces the hand" of
LDCs.
17. See, e.g., SHIVA, supra note 96; Biocolonialism Patent Mightier Than Sword, THE
STATESMAN (India), Mar. 3,1998.
18. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
[Vol. 4
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DCs are able to use PGRs held within third world countries to their benefit
without distributing any of the rents back to the LDCs. This system
presupposes that nations do not have sovereign rights over the PGRs
within their borders. Thus, PGRs leave the South as the "common heritage
of mankind" and return as "individually owned" commodities for sale at
prices that inhibit many citizens of the LDCs, from which the PGRs
originated, from having access to them.
Further aggravating distributive justice concerns is the fact that many
of the "inventors" that are awarded patent protection for their "inventions"
would not have developed their end-products without the help of
indigenous communities. Many bio-prospectors rely upon the advice of
indigenous communities to identify plants that may have specific uses.19
They then send those plants to labs where they are tested, screened, and
sometimes developed into marketable products. While the corporations
from DCs collect the rents from these products, the contributions of
indigenous knowledge go unrecognized and uncompensated.
A. The Neem Tree
While there are many examples that illustrate the inequities in the
current system, the Neem tree is perhaps the most illustrative. Indians
have used the Neem tree for centuries. They have used the bark to clean
teeth, the leaf juice to treat skin disorders and control infections, and the
seeds as spermicide and insecticide. Researchers capitalized on this
knowledge and isolated a chemical called azadirachtin in the seed. They
were able to stabilize the chemical so that it could be sold commercially.
W.R. Grace & Co. subsequently sought and received a patent on
azadirachtin in the United States.20 Neemix, the name of the pesticide
containing azadirachtin, has brought great profits to W.R. Grace & Co.
Neither the Indian government, nor native Indians, have received any
compensation. 21 Additionally, the price of Neem is now so high that many
INFORMATION SOCIETY 142 (1996).
19. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of Scientific and
Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 919, 929 (1996)
("Thus the 'shaman' is no longer a 'witch doctor' but a healer with knowledge of traditional
remedies worthy of new respect from Western science.").
20. U.S. Patent No. 5,281,618.
21. See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 19, at 922 (noting that Grace does not plan on
compensating India calling Indian knowledge "folk medicine"). But cf. Bojoy B. Patro, India-
Trade: Patent Denial Boosts Foes of Bio-Piracy, Inter Press Service, Sept. 4, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Group File (describing the successful legal challenge by India's Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) of a patent on the use of turmeric granted by the
USPTO to the University of Mississippi Medical Center in December 1993).
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local farmers can no longer afford it.n
B. The IP Policy in the Context of the DC Framework
Perhaps one of the more contradictory aspects of the position taken by
DCs is the call for greater "responsibility" on the part of LDCs with regards
to the preservation of ecological resources.' DCs view subsidies for
preservation as charity as opposed to contributions. The Developed
Countries' position might be summed up as follows:
The conservation of environmental habitats is central to
the continued production of global public goods such as
oxygen, and PGRs. Even though you can derive profits by
consuming these resources as private goods, you have an
obligation to preserve these habitats so that the world can
benefit from the continued use of the global public goods.
And, you should bear the entire burden of paying for the
global public goods.
Not only is this a poor utilitarian strategy, it is normatively
problematic. It is the equivalent of a policy that would free anyone within
the richest five percent in the United States from paying any taxes, thereby
increasing the burden on the middle class and poor. Most would agree
that a policy that forces those who have the fewest resources to pay for
public goods while allowing the richest part of the population to pay little
would be both irrational and unjust.
Compounding the difficulty with the proposition that LDCs have a
moral obligation to bear the cost of ecological preservation, is the fact that
the very countries that condemn LDCs for not conserving used
deforestation and consumption of ecological resources during their own
period of industrialization. 24 Audiences in DCs feel it is ironic that the
United States and other DCs refused to accept IPRs during the period of
time when they were developing but now suggest that IPRs are somehow
essential to development, the natural right of inventors, and fundamental
22. See, e.g., David S. Tilford, Saving the Blueprints: The International Legal Regime for Plant
Resources, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 373, 377 (1998) (arguing that people in LDCs are often
forced to purchase from the Developed World that which they provided without charge).
23. See Odek, supra note 12, at 158:
The poor countries have been told to preserve their forests and other
genetic resources on the off-chance that at some future date something is
discovered which might prove useful to humanity .... We are also told
that the rich will not agree to compensate the poor for their sacrifices.
24. See MAY, supra note 1 at 85-6.
[Vol. 4
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tenets of an international fair trade.
C. Insufficient DC Justifications
Aside from the argument that LDCs have some sort of moral obligation
to conserve their ecosystems, the DCs have offered two main arguments in
support of the current international regime. First, they argue that IPRs are
necessary to protect corporations from the theft of intellectual property.
They claim that DCs had a right to demand stronger IPR protection
through TRIPs in order to prevent LDCs from free-riding off of corporate
investments by pirating their products.2n Second, they suggest that LDCs
do not deserve compensation for products derived from raw germplasm.
Applying a romantic version of natural rights theory,6 the DCs propose
that no one should own the genetic resources within plants. They then
argue that once scientists have transformed these raw materials into useful
inventions, they become intellectual goods worthy of protection. Because
conserving the resources, and in some cases pointing out their potential
usefulness to scientists, are not "innovative steps," the LDCs have no right
to the commercial profits that are the products of the intellect of scientists.
To augment these normative claims, the DCs propose utilitarian
defenses for the current regime. They contend that ineffectual IPR regimes,
and schemes that force corporations to redistribute wealth to LDCs, will
serve as barriers to innovation. Appealing to the idealistic vision that
technological innovation is the solution to all problems, the DCs propose
that the current international regime will ultimately help the LDCs by
producing more socially valuable goods. Additionally, DCs propose that
LDCs who have not had strict IPR regimes have suffered because these
policies have prevented them from attracting foreign capital and from
stimulating domestic technological growth. The not-so-implicit suggestion
has been that governments of the LDCs have pursued strategies that have
stunted their own growth and that TRIPs is a way to force countries to help
themselves.
While each of these arguments has some merit, collectively they fail to
address the concerns raised by indigenous communities and the
governments of LDCs. Although they do suggest that there are legitimate
claims to be made on each side of the controversy, they fail to acknowledge
25. See e.g., Michael L. Doane, Trips and International Intellectual Property Protection in an
Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 470 (1994) ("[Slome
pharmaceutical companies face foreign competitors who misappropriate information with the
active assistance and encouragement of their governments to produce inexpensive and
potentially ineffective or dangerous imitations.").
26. See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
2001]
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the guilt of DCs in stunting the development of LDCs by forcing them to
consume and denying them access to valuable bio-technologies and
pharmaceuticals. The DCs also fail to recognize the human rights of
indigenous communities who have a powerful claim that they too are
"being robbed."
D. Summation
In this Part, I have attempted to provide the normative answer to the
macro-question, "Why change?" In a world very much unlike the one in
which we live, this would be sufficient to instigate policy reorientation.
While I do not deny that human rights and development issues are
instigators for change, I am not persuaded that simply illuminating the
distributional consequences of the actions of DCs is sufficient to revise the
system. Thus, in Part III, I attempt to answer the 'why change" question
by providing an efficiency-based justification. Before moving to this
secondary explanation, I provide a more detailed sketch of the problem in
Part II.
II. BIO-PROSPECTING AND THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SCHEME
A. How PGRs Are Used
Over the last several decades scientists and researchers in DCs have
discovered that PGRs, which are almost exclusively found within the
borders of LDCs,' are an important source for the development of
commercially valuable end products.' For example, PGRs have been used
to bioengineer seeds,29 develop pesticides,30 and produce pharmaceuticals.3'
27. See, e.g., BECHER, supra note 5, at 96 (noting that nearly half of the world's species are
concentrated in 17 "Global Hotspots" that comprise two percent of the world's surface area
and are all within the borders of LDCs).
28. See, e.g., Huft, supra note 12, at 1679 ("It has recently become apparent to many
pharmaceutical companies... that the imagination of synthetic chemists is far less creative
that that of nature, and a renewed effort has been underway for the last several years to search
the natural world for sources of new pharmaceuticals."); Laura Tangley, Ilya Raskin: Probing
The Roots of Plant-Based Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan., 2000, available in LEXIS,
Magazine Stories, Combined File (explaining how new technologies that are being used in
combination with PGRs to develop pharmaceutical products).
29. Many insect-resistant and high-yield crops have been developed by using PGRs
discovered through bioprospecting. See, e.g., Odek, supra note 12, at 143.
30. One of the most valuable, and perhaps the most notorious, pesticides that has been
developed from bio-prospecting is Neemix which is derived from the Neem tree. This case is
[Vol. 4
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The commercial value of these products is a byproduct of gaining property
rights in them through established patent systems in DCs.
Industrialists who thrive on these end products have three
fundamental objectives: securing strong patent protection for their end
products, conserving a large supply of PGRs with which to work 2 and
stemming the destruction of indigenous communities upon which they so
heavily rely to identify plants with potentially valuable PGRs.33 While they
have generally succeeded on the first objective, they have failed miserably
on the last two. Today, both the world's plant biodiversity and indigenous
knowledge are being rapidly depleted.Y
B. TRIPS
While the leaders of DCs have repeatedly called on LDCs to enhance
their conservation efforts, they have simultaneously pushed for legal
regimes that deny LDCs compensation when their PGRs are used
commercially by DCs. This relationship is acutely and powerfully codified
in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPs"),7 signed in 1994 as a part of the Uruguay Round of General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT"). 6  Macroscopically, TRIPs
creates an international floor of IP protection below which all signatory
countries agree not to go. DCs, pressured by corporations who regard the
discussed more carefully in Part I.
31. Some estimate that as many as 30% of the drugs that have been discovered in the last
15 to 20 years have been developed using bio-prospecting. See, e.g., Parlange, supra note 4.
For example, Quinine, the cure for Malaria comes from the bark of the Peruvian cinchona tree.
The rosy periwinkle, found in Madagascar, has been used to develop vincristine and
vinblastine, both pharmaceuticals that are used to combat Hodgkin's disease and pediatric
lympothic leukemia. See, e.g., Shayana Kadidal, Note, Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical
Patents, 103 YALE L.J. 223, 223 (1993).
Aside from examples discussed here, bioprospecting has been used to produce a
number of other commercial products. For example, the endod berry, found in Ethiopia, has
been used in the maritime industry to kill zebra mussels. See, Roht-Arriaza, supra note 19, at
923.
32. "[Olne can think of wild genetic resources as a lottery ticket containing a vast number
of genetic tickets, each with a different potential payoff." Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights,
Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological Change, 35 J.L. & ECON. 199, 204 (1992). This is true
because the vast majority of plant species have yet to be identified and of those that have been
identified even fewer have been studied in depth. See Odek, supra note 12, at 144. As the
number of these "lottery tickets" decreases so too does the chance of "winning the lottery."
33. See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 19, at 921-29.
34. By focusing on the role of PGRs in developing commercial end products, I do not
intend to minimize the more fundamental danger that these losses create in terms of the
stability of the world's ecosystem.
35. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
36. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A - 11, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The GATT treaty was originally signed in 1947 with the aim of
reducing international trade barriers. Since 1947 there have been several "rounds" of
negotiations between the member countries aimed at lowering trade barriers.
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expansion of IPRs as crucial to their wealth maximization, were the driving
force behind TRIPs. LDCs who generally regard strong IPRs as inhibitors
of their own development, were, for the most part, vehemently opposed to
the agreement.37
It is not surprising that when the dispute came to a head, the DCs
prevailed. They did so by integrating their IP agenda into the GATV8 The
coercive maneuver left LDCs between the proverbial "rock and a hard
place." By including TRIPs into the larger agreement, LDCs were forced
into signing the agreement because rejecting it would have required them
to rebuff the entire GATT agreement.3 The GATT is important to LDCs
because non-participation in it means virtually shutting oneself out of the
international trade market that holds the key to achieving economic
growth for many LDCs. Additionally, the preeminence of trade policy is
such that sour trade relations have spillover effects into other crucial
realms such as international aid for development.
LDCs were correct to note that global IPRs had never been included as
part of the GATT. '  DCs nonetheless forged ahead because they
understood that the GATT was their best opportunity to "convince" LDCs
to enforce more stringent IP standards.4 The DCs defended themselves by
arguing that "piracy" by LDCs constituted an unfair trade advantage and
amounted to a significant trade barrier. LDCs, understanding that they
would be at a severe bargaining disadvantage if IPRs were attached to the
GATT, called on DCs to negotiate an independent treaty within the
framework of the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO)-a
branch of the United Nations.43 The DCs, who were aware that they would
forego their bargaining advantage" if they agreed to WIPO negotiations,
37. See, e.g., Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 106 (1993).
38. Multinational corporations who developed products argued that their patents should
extend beyond national borders and that their inability to obtain patent protection for some of
their goods in foreign jurisdictions was a trade barrier. See, e.g., Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and
Politics: The International Legal Regime Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J.
INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 111, 126-27 (1996)..
39. See, e.g., Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of the
Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 110 (1995).
40. See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 37, at 106-07.
41. Id.
42. See Bosselmann, supra note 38.
43. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.WIPO was developed to address international IP
issues. Since its inception, DCs have generally disfavored WIPO because they perceive the
organization to be biased in favor of LDCs. See, e.g., David G. Scalise and Daniel Nugent,
Comment, International Intellectual Property Protection for Living Matter: Biotechnology,
Multinational Conventions and the Exception for Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83, 107
(1995) ("WIPO embodies a strong proclivity towards the plight of developing nations, who
compose a majority of UN membership.").
44. See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 37, at 107; cf Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS:
The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the
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refused. 5 DCs appreciated that the GATT, dominated by the DCs, would
be a domain in which they would have greater say than they would in
WIPO where the LDCs and DCs are not necessarily placed on different
footing.
Although the TRIPs agreement addresses issues in copyright, patent,
and trademark law, the patent issues turned out to be amongst the most
contentious. The United States government, pressured by the highly
influential pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, took a
particularly hard line regarding the patent provisions, insisting on the
inclusion of U.S.-style patent standards. Both of these industries are
particularly dependent on strong patent protection because of a
combination of the high costs of research and development that are
necessary to produce new products and the relative ease with which they
can be copied via reverse engineering. 46
Despite their vociferous opposition, LDCs ultimately had no choice but
to relent and sign. 7 Part of the strong opposition by LDCs can be
explained by their understanding that non-compliance with TRIPs would
not be a safe fall-back option. As part of GATT, TRIPs will be enforced
through the World Trade Organization ("WTO")" dispute resolution
process.49 Thus, because of the threat of trade sanctions, LDCs will have a
strong incentive not to violate or circumvent TRIPs.
The legal status of PGRs was itself a hotly contested issue in the TRIPs
negotiations. The battle lines were roughly as follows: The DCs sought a
long patent termn° and a broad definition of "patentable subject matter;"
LDCs sought a short patent term, and a narrow definition of "patentable
subject matter" that would exclude plants, products derived from PGRs,
and living organisms." The "compromise solution," that TRIPs celebrated
45. Weissman, supra note 44, at 1083-84.
46. See, e.g., Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement:
Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Countries Toward the Patentability of Biotechnology, 6
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 48 (noting that only one in five thousand pharmaceutical products ever
reaches the market, and therefore, pharmaceutical companies rely on patent protection and
monopoly prices to make up for sunk R&D costs); Weissman, supra note 44, at 1075-76.
47. See, e.g., Gana, supra note 39, at 110 (noting that nations desiring to be part of the
liberal trading system have been forced to accept TRIPs as a prerequisite to that privilege).
48. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization (World Trade
Organization) Dec. 15, 1993,33 I.L.M. 13 (1994).
49. This was important to the DCs because they consider the WTO to be a more effective
enforcement body than WIPO or the International Court of Justice for resolving commercial
disputes over IP violations. See e.g., Weissman, supra note 44, at 1095 ("[The WTO] is likely to
apply severe pressure on countries to alter patent or other laws to found by a dispute
settlement panel to be WTO-illegal.... The threat of "cross-sectoral retaliation"-the
imposition of sanctions against a different economic sector than the one in which the WTO-
illegal law exists-will be particularly coercive.").
50. See, e.g., McCabe supra note 46, at 44.
51. Id. There are several reasons why LDCs have protested stronger international IPRs.
Among the most prevalent fears are that lPRs will result in high prices and will limit
accessibility and technology transfers and that patents will be used by transnational
corporations as instruments of control. See, e.g., Valentina Tejera, Note, Tripping Over Property
Rights: Is it Possible to Reconcile the Convention on Biological Diversity with Article 27 of the TRIPs
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itself as, demonstrated the imbalance in bargaining power between the
LDCs and DCs. The DCs were able to secure the patentability of living
organisms and biological processes, including seeds and pharmaceuticals."
They secured a minimum patent term of 17 years from the date of filing.
The LDCs "won" the exclusion from patentability of methods of treatment
of humans or animals, 3 and plants and animals themselves." If, however,
a State chooses not to extend full patent protection to plant varieties, they
must provide protection for them by an "effective sui generis system."5
While this provision can be interpreted broadly so as to leave LDCs a
great deal of leeway, most commentators agree that this phrase will be
interpreted by the WTO to refer to a system modeled after the International
Conference for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants ("UPOV").' The
UPOV provides protection for new plant varieties that are clearly
distinguishable by one or more characteristic, homogenous in their sexual
reproduction or vegetative propagation, and stable in their essential
characteristics.7 The convention was most recently modified in 1991; the
modifications "altered the standard of protection from a modified
copyright model to a modified patent model. " ' Hence, while UPOV is
somewhat more favorable to LDCs than the U.S.-style patent protection for
plants, it does not represent that much of a victory for LDCs because
"plants" are defined narrowly and because the "sui generis" protection is
still relatively stringent.'
The final concession LDCs were able to "win" was a five to ten year
transition period for the implementation of TRIPs. The longer terms are
applicable to those countries where the patent protections are being
extended to products that were not previously the subject of domestic
patent protection.6°
Agreement?, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 967 (1999); Bosselmann, supra note 38, at 127.
52. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 35, at art. 27.
53. See id. at art. 27.3 (stating that members may exclude "diagnostic, therapeutic and
surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals").
54. Id. ("Members may exclude "plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-
biological and microbiological processes.").
55. Id. at art. 27.3 (b) ("Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either
by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof.").
56. International Conference for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961,
815 U.N.T.S. 89, 92. For support for the proposition that TRIPs will be interpreted so as to
require LDCs to maintain a minimal floor equal to that set by UPOV, see for example, Roht-
Arriaza, supra note 19; and J. Benjamin Bai, Comment, Protecting Plant Varieties under TRIPS
and NAFTA: Should Utility Patents be Available for Plants?, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 139, 140 (1997).
57. See, McCabe, supra note 46, at 58.
58. Id. at 59.
59. Id.
60. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 35, at art. 65. DCs agreed to a transition period, in
part, because they recognized that it would be very costly and time consuming for LDCs to
develop an infrastructure to properly assign and enforce IP rights as they are required to do
by TRIPs. See, e.g., Robert Sherwood, The TRIPs Agreement: Implications for Developing
Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 527-28 (1997) (describing the tremendous burden building an
infrastructure compliant with TRIPs will place on LDCs).
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C. Before TRIPS
While it is quite clear that nations that fail to comply with the TRIPs
provisions will be in violation of their international commitment, and will
be sanctioned by the WTO, there are several other conventions and
treaties that predate TRIPs. These are briefly discussed here because they
help illuminate the nature and intensity of the dispute.
The first major international effort to confront the issue of bio-
prospecting was a resolution passed by the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization ("FAO") in 1983,62 called the International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources ("FAO Undertaking").' The FAO
Undertaking is premised on the principle that all plant germplasm is "the
common heritage of mankind."' The intent of the FAO Undertaking was
that both "raw" germplasm and the commercial products derived
therefrom, would be treated as the "common heritage of mankind" or
global public goods.6 For apparent reasons, DCs rejected the FAO
Undertaking arguing that it constituted a violation of their private property
systems.' While they refused to accept the principle that their commercial
products were the "common heritage of mankind," they had no qualms
with the proposition that raw germplasm should be treated as common
heritage.67 Thus, DCs developed their patent systems granting property
rights to commercial products derived from PGRs while simultaneously
denying the existence of any property rights in the PGRs themselves.
Frustrated by the refusal of the DCs to recognize the validity of the
FAO Undertaking, the LDCs reintroduced the issue at the 1992 United
61. See, e.g., Tejera, supra note 51, at 981 (noting that India is resisting the WTO's demands
to implement TRIPs requirements and that the WTO has responded by threatening sanctions);
Scalise & Nugent, supra note 43, at 117 (detailing the ability of the United States to use Special
301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, and
other statutes, as trade sanctions to punish nations that violate IPRs in a way that hurts the
competitiveness of U.S. firms).
62. One of the outcomes of the FAO Undertaking that has raised a great deal of
controversy is the system of international seed banks that make up the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) that was set up after the Undertaking. These
seed banks were built, mostly within the borders of DCs, as ex situ preservation sites for
germplasm, mostly from LDCs. The system was designed to make the germplasm, as well as
the commercial products developed from it, the "common heritage of mankind." See, e.g.,
Kadidal supra note 31, at 229. The seed banks, however, have been used largely as
mechanisms to preserve germplasm from LDCs for uncompensated use by DCs. See, e.g., Odek,
supra note 12, at 167 ("This lack of international control has facilitated the transfer of plant
genetic resource [sic] from their centers of origin to the gene banks of developed countries.
This situation has illuminated the absence of clear mechanisms, other than moral suasion, for
enforcing the free exchange of plant genetic resources in gene banks.").
63. International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, at 22, U.N. Doc. C/83/REP
(1983).
64. See, e.g, Bosselmann, supra note 38, at 132.
65. See id. at 133
66. See, e.g., id. at 133-34.
67. See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 19, at 943; Tilford, supra note 22, at 377 (noting that
DCs defend this system by arguing that benefits will "flow back" to the LDCs).
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Nations Convention on Environment and Development.68 The issues
related to PGRs were specifically addressed within the Convention on
Biological Diversity ("CBD").69 LDCs and DCs were once again split. While
the negotiations did ultimately result in a treaty, the United States refused
to sign it and the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Switzerland would
only sign with reservations.' In the end, the U.S. government grudgingly
signed the treaty. When it did so it offered its own "interpretive statement"
which, in many substantial ways, effectively diluted the CBD's force.'
While the CBD addresses many issues, the most relevant for the
purposes of this Note is the way in which PGRs are treated. The Preamble
to the CBD states that the conservation of biological diversity is a "common
concern of humankind." This language is different from that of the FAO
Undertaking, which states that biological diversity is the "common heritage
of mankind." 73
Although there are several articles of the CBD that one could argue are
applicable to the issue of PGRs, a few are particularly relevant. Article 3
acknowledges the "sovereign rights of States over their natural
resources."74 The implication of Article 3 is that PGRs should no longer be
regarded as the "common heritage of mankind." Article 15, "Access to
Genetic Resources," is even more specific-"the authority to determine
access to genetic resources rests with the government." 7 Additionally, it
mandates "the sharing in a fair and equitable way, the results of research
and development and the development and the benefits arising from the
commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Party
providing such resources."m Article 16 emphasizes the need to establish
access to, and transfer of, technology to LDCs.78 The CBD fails, however, to
propose a structural mechanism to enforce or enact these provisions.7
Therefore, while it is hard to argue with the claim that the CBD was a
landmark event in international law, the impressive opaqueness' of the
68. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development was held from
June 3-14, 1992. It involved 30,000 participants from 176 countries. See, e.g., Ajay K. Sharma,
The Global Loss of Biodiversity, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 9 (1995).
69. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5,1992,31 I.L.M. 818. [hereinafter CBDI.
70. See Tilford, supra note 22, at 412 (pointing out that other DCs followed suit after the
United States refused to sign the CBD).
71. Bosselmann, supra note 38, at 136-37.
72. See CBD, supra note 69.
73. See, e.g., Bosselmann, supra note 38, at 136737.
74. CBD, supra note 69, at art. 3.
75. See, e.g., Bosselnann, supra note 38, at 137.
76. CBD, supra note 69, at art. 15.
77. Id., art. 15 § 7.
78. Id., art. 16 § 4.
79. See, e.g., Sharma, supra note 68, at 23 ("The end result [of Article 161 is therefore
ambivalent and susceptible to varying interpretations.").
80. The Earth Conference: Biodivisive, ECONOMIST, June 13, 1992, at 93, 94;see also, Tilford,
supra note 22, at 378 ("[W]hile the Biodiversity Convention recognizes the rights of countries
to claim control over their genetic resources, it does not attempt to determine the amount and
form of compensation."); Kadidal, supra note 31, at 226 ("Like many modem multilateral
treaties, the Rio Convention makes clear its goals but not the means to implement them.").
[Vol. 4
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treaty's language and the failure to elaborate an enforcement mechanism
seriously undercut its effectiveness.
Given that the United States did sign the CBD, one could make the case
(and many have) that TRIPs is a violation of international law. DCs, most
prominently the United States, have responded by noting that the CBD was
only signed with reservations.81 The letter sent by President Clinton in 1993
to the Senate when the CBD was ratified included language that has been
used to support this contention. President Clinton's letter states that any
efforts leading to a decrease in levels of protection for IPRs would be
strongly resisted by the United States.' LDCs' resentful reaction to the
letter and their fears that it would be held up as a defense against
violations of the CBD were validated soon after the CBD ended when the
U.S. began lobbying for inclusion of TRIPs into the GATT."
Several empirical examples could be cited to demonstrate the position
taken by the United States. I have chosen one. In 1998 Rice-Tec, Inc.
obtained a patent from the United States Patent and Trademark Office for a
strain of basmati rice." It also secured a trademark in the use of the word
"basmati."8 Basmati rice has been a staple in India for centuries.' The
Indian government challenged the patent because the patented strain
clearly incorporates an Indian PGR and exploits Indian knowledge without
compensation. 87 Citing the CBD, they claimed that India should either
receive compensation or that the patent and trademark should be
revoked.' The corporation defended its actions, in part, by arguing that
the United States only committed to the CBD as long as that commitment
did not interfere with the ability of corporations to obtain IPRs in their
inventions." They argued that claims, such as the ones made by India,
would frustrate that ability.9 In addition, they relied on TRIPs to argue
that the attempts by India to pass legislation protecting its natural
81. The reservations pertained mainly to Articles 15 and 16. Pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies were afraid that the Articles would be interpreted in a way that
would commit DCs to compulsory licensing and IP expropriation. See, e.g., U.S. Biotech
Companies Leery of Biodiversity Treaty, STAR TRIB., June 11, 1992.
82. Letter of Transmittal from William J. Clinton to the United States Senate, Convention
on Biological Diversity 1 (Nov. 19, 1993), available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 796847 at *1.
There were four principle areas of concern laid out in the letter: "(1) the treaty is not
retroactive, (2) transfer of technology must be voluntary and must take into account
companies' exclusive rights to the technologies they own, (3) there will be no compulsory
licensing and (4) biosafety protocol on the safety of biotechnology products in not necessary."
See, Scalise & Nugent, supra note 43, at 112.
83. See, e.g., Scalise & Nugent, supra note 43, at 113 ("International commentators accuse
the U.S. of attempting to unilaterally obtain the terms it was unable to procure in treaty
negotiations.").
84. See, e.g., India to Approach US Patent Office over Basmati Patent, ASIA PULSE (New
Delhi), Feb. 13, 1998.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.; Basmati Patent to be Challenged in U.S. Court, THE HINDU (New Delhi), Apr. 25,
2000.
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resources and indigenous knowledge "runs contrary to the objective of the
TRIPs Agreement of simplifying world trade."9 Regardless of the ultimate
outcome of this particular controversy, it acutely demonstrates that TRIPs
has been interpreted by DCs so as to trump the provisions of the CBD as
they might apply to bio-prospecting.
D. Summation
This Part has demonstrated the way in which PGRs are used in the
development of commercially valuable products. It has briefly described
the current international legal regime centered around TRIPs that protects
property rights in the form of IP for these products. It has also briefly
traced the history of the dispute over PGRs and given some context with
which to appreciate the nature of the controversy. Part III offers my
critique of TRIPs and the present legal status of PGRs. I attempt to set up
my argument for an IBPO and a system in which both LDCs and DCs are
granted property rights by contending that the present system is sub-
optimal for everyone involved.
III. THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL REGIME IS INEFFECTIVE AND INEFFICIENT
Two aspects of international lawmaking stand in the way of an
effective solution to the global environmental crisis9--(1) it is difficult to
convince rational politicians to make sacrifices today in order to reap gains
for future generations,9 and (2) international actors are ultimately
accountable to their own self-interested constituencies.9 Thus, even though
efforts to limit the loss of biodiversity have been on the international
91. Id. at 983.
92. Surely one could argue that there are many other problems that plague international
environmental agreements. I wish to simply focus on these two for the purposes of this Note.
93. As an initial matter, one might respond that by redistributing wealth now politicians
can ensure that more overall wealth will be secured for the future and therefore as rational
actors they should prefer solutions that make conservation profitable for LDCs. This
argument is knotty because it assumes that rational actors will make sacrifices in the status
quo in order to reap future profits. (This problem becomes even more difficult when one takes
into account the fact that many of the "profits" that will be derived from conservation, will be
enjoyed by future generations. For a discussion of a similar problem, see generally Ronald R.
Rychlack, Ocean Aquaculture, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 497 (1997), which discusses the problem
of overaquification.
94. Because they are generally part of democratic governments, leaders of DCs are
primarily accountable to their own constituencies. In democratic systems, politicians' primary
and underlying objective is to win elections. See generally Joseph Schlesinger, AMBITION AND
POLITICS: POLITICAL CAREERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1966). Specific special interest groups,
such as the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry, at whose expense wealth distribution
strategies would be pursued, have a vested interest in legislation to expand their profit
margins. Therefore, they pool their efforts and coalesce their influence in order to "convince"
politicians not to pursue redistribution policies. The result is that what seems irrational from a
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agenda for almost three decades,95 by most accounts, the effort is failing. If
my two propositions are true-that it is hard to make sacrifices today to
benefit tomorrow, and international actors have to be responsive to self-
interested constituencies-then solutions have to be designed so as to
maximize short- term benefits and distribute these gains between and
amongst the parties. In other words, conservation strategies have a low
probability of succeeding unless they are appealing from an economic
perspective (i.e. LDCs are not willing to forego short-term economic rents
in order to provide for global public goods for the world's enjoyment and
for their own long-term benefit).'
Earlier, I proposed that of the three goals of industrialists-maximizing
patent protection, conserving biodiversity and preserving indigenous
knowledge-only the first was being satisfied. In this Part, I hope to show
how the TRIPs agreement and the rest of the current international regime
ensure that end. I propose that while the status quo may maximize patent
protection, it does nothing to aid in conservation-an outcome that is sub-
optimal from the perspective of LDCs as well as DCs. I should note again
that I am writing here as a positivist not in an effort to obscure the
normative problems with the status-quo regime, but rather, to be
pragmatic about what it takes to "get things done.,
97
A. The Regime is Sub-Optimal From the Global Perspective
The current international regime can be evaluated from three distinct
perspectives-the "global community,"'98 the LDCs, and the DCs-it is sub-
optimal from all three. From the perspective of the "global community"
the status quo regime is sub-optimal because the world's biodiversity is
being depleted, thereby threatening the ecosystems upon which the human
race depends for quality of life and ultimately, for survival. In short, while
95. In 1970 the first United Nations Conference on the Environment was held in
Stockholm. Nearly ten years later, in 1979, British ecologist Norman Myers published the first
findings on tropical rain forest destruction. His findings inspired many in the international
community to focus their attention to the problems posed by the loss of biodiversity. See id. at
57-61.
96. Some have suggested that ecological destruction is a direct consequence of capitalism
and that the only way to end biodiversity loss is to replace capitalism. See generally VANDANA
SHIVA, CAPTIVE MINDS, CAPTIVE LIVES (1995) While addressing this issue is beyond the scope
of this Note, I do not believe that the overthrow of capitalism is preferable and it is almost
certainly not imminent. If we begin with the baseline that the world is increasingly capitalist
and countries who hope to succeed must maximize wealth, developing economic incentives to
conserve is valuable. See, e.g., Tilford, supra note 22, at 376 (arguing that countries with the
richest biodiversity are eager to develop quickly in order to "catch up" with the developed
world's standard of living and to keep up with their population growth).
97. It is critical that a proposed solution establish some middle ground between the LDCs
and DCs. From a political perspective, this is essential because politicians might be able to
expend the political capital necessary to replace the status quo with a compromise solution.
They would not, however, have enough political capital to replace the current international
regime with a regime that was heavily biased in favor of LDCs.
98. The term "global community" is used to refer to a holistic view of the world in which
efficiency is measured globally rather than through the lens of any individual actor.
2001]
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the current international legal regime does provide incentives for the
development of valuable "innovations" such as pharmaceuticals, it is
inefficient because it encourages the over-consumption of the natural
resources necessary for the discovery of new innovations and upon which
all of life depends.
B. The Regime is Sub-Optimal from the LDCs' Perspective
For LDCs the status-quo regime is troublesome because whatever
benefits TRIPs might create for them pales in comparison to the harms that
come in two forms-the decreased availability of socially beneficial goods
and the denial of any of the profits that are derived by industrialists who
use their PGRs.
Let me first address and disprove the significance of the supposed
benefits. There are two main proposals within this genre-that TRIPs will
spur growth and development,9 and indigenous communities will learn to
use IP laws to their own advantage. While the first argument-that TRIPs
will spur growth and development-has a kernel of merit, it does not take
into account the fact that DCs are already so far ahead of LDCs in
technological development that, given the expense of building and
maintaining a productive research and development infrastructure, °u most
LDCs will be unable to ramp up to the scale necessary to successfully
compete in the international market-at least not anytime in the near
future.'1
99. See, e.g., McCabe, supra note 46, at 46-47 ("[Ilt has been suggested that a patent system
stimulates investment by reducing the risk of innovation.... [As a consequence] the benefits
that enhanced intellectual property protection provide are not limited to developed
countries."); Scalise & Nugent, supra note 43, at 104 (arguing that failure to compensate
inventors of new and improved products for their inventions will lead to a sub-optimal level
of innovation and that because innovation helps LDCs as well as DCs, LDCs will ultimately
suffer from weak IP protections); Sherwood, supra note 60, at 504 (arguing that countries with
robust IP protection encourage private investment).
100. R & D costs in industries such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology can be so
tremendous that many companies, even in the DC, are unable to compete. See, e.g., CARLOS
M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 39 (2000)
("[Iun most cases, patents will be simply out of reach for least developed countries and many
other developing countries, because of the high standards to be complied with. The patent
system as an incentive to local innovations is unlikely to work, except in those countries
where there already exist a significant scientific and technological infrastructure and firms of
considerable size."); Joseph A. DiMasi, New Drug Development: Cost, Risk and Complexity, DRUG
INFO. J., May 1995, at 357.
101. There are several reasons, aside from the sheer cost of R & D, for this conclusion.
First, the western IP model is based on the existence of a market economy where private
capital and open trade are encouraged. Because many LDCs do not fit this mold, the western
IF model will not necessarily apply to many LDCs. See McCabe, supra note 46, at 54. Second,
patent protection will raise the price of goods for LDCs who will have to rely on exports. This
price will be sensitive to currency exchanges and the pricing of monopoly goods over
competitive levels. Because pirated technology can help fuel economic development, the
system will have the short-term effect of slowing growth and development. Id. at 55-6. But see
Mark Ritchie et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity: The Industrialization of Natural
Resources and Traditional Knowledge, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT, 431, 437 n.39 (1996)
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Proponents of TRIPs have also suggested that LDCs could exploit
TRIPs by securing IPRs in their knowledge of PGRs.' 2 This argument fails
because it does not recognize that TRIPs is constructed on the basis of a
particular free market model that accords property rights to the products of
"invention" but does not recognize property rights in PGRs or in the
knowledge of indigenous communities.
1 0 3
Professor Oddi provides the greatest clarity on this point. His work
reviews the justifications offered by DCs for TRIPs and concludes that
TRIPs represents a shift in the prevailing theory of patents from an
instrumentalist form of "reward" theory to a "natural rights" theory.1°' The
reward theory is based on the principle that the patent is a "reward"
granted by the state to inventors that is meant to induce more invention.
Conversely, the "natural rights" theory suggests that inventors have some
normative right to the products of their labor."° The patent is a mechanism
the State uses to codify that right.1"
Corporations turned to these normative arguments when it became
apparent that the proposition that the international piracy of their goods
was stifling the research and development of new innovations was
unpersuasive. By claiming that "inventors" have natural rights in their
work, DCs could defend TRIPs on the principle that because inventors
have a natural right to their intellectual property, the right is, by definition,
(arguing that "intellectual property pirating fuels development").
102. See, e.g., Hanning, supra note 6 (exploring ways in which indigenous communities
might be able to secure IPRs in their knowledge within the western patent system).
103. "Raw germplasm" would be considered a "product of nature," which would not be
patentable in the western system. For a detailed explanation of the natural- product
exemption, see, for example, Kadidal, supra note 31, at 237-44. There are other reasons why
patent applications for germplasm would be rejected. First, courts would probably determine
that there is no element of "novelty" or "newness." Second, because the plants have been
used, in some cases for centuries, the "non-obviousness" requirement would present a
formidable barrier. Third, patent law requires that the subject of the patent be "capable of
industrial application." Indigenous communities would have a difficult time demonstrating
the industrial applications of their products. Fourth, patented inventions must be
"reproducible." Germplasm may not be reproducible in the way that the western system
requires. Fifth, many patents may be denied because of publication. Under United States
patent law if an invention has been published it is considered to be in the public domain and
obvious. Many products used by indigenous communities have been documented in print by
ethnobiologists.
For a more detailed explanation of the restraints on the patenting of germplasm, see
Roht-Arriaza supra note 19 at 936-942. But see, Sarma, supra note 12, at 128, for evidence that
some indigenous communities are succeeding in getting patents for their "inventions."
Whether or not there is room for some IPRs to be granted to indigenous communities for their
knowledge, the bulk of the evidence suggests that indigenous communities will, by in large,
be severely disadvantaged within the western IP system.
104. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS - Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Imperialism," 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996).
105. See. e.g., Oddi, supra note 104, at 426-27 ("In contradistinction to being based upon
positive law - constitutional or statutory - natural rights, being an entitlement to personhood
or rationally following from higher principles, devolve from a higher source."); Boyle, supra
note 18, at 119-43 (arguing that the current international IP regime is obsessed with the
concept of "authorship" and distinguishing the ways in which this model hurts indigenous
communities while protecting inventors from DCs).
106. See Oddi, supra note 104, at 455-58.
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territorially universal.' Article 27 of TRIPs, which deals with patentable
subject matter, is particularly reflective of this line of reasoning. °"
The "natural rights" theory does not allow LDCs to collect rents from
their PGRs because the germplasm is not an "invention" and therefore
LDCs do not have a normative right to it. Even if one were to recognize
that much of the germplasm used by DCs in developing commercial end
products is not "raw," but rather is often the product of centuries of
selection and natural breeding by indigenous communities, the
"inventorship" model is based on individual, rather than collective,
knowledge and ownership."8
Not only are the potential advantages of TRIPs meager for LDCs, there
are serious disadvantages. Initially, the TRIPs agreement leads to the
decreased availability of socially beneficial goods because it forces
countries to recognize the validity of patents in products that have not been
the subjects of patent protection in those countries. Ergo, products such as
pharmaceuticals, which could previously be reverse engineered by
corporations in LDCs and sold as generics at affordable prices,"' will no
longer be available. Additionally, TRIPs does not have "work the patent"
requirements.' Therefore, a corporation is not obliged to market a
product in a country in order to maintain its monopoly right there. Thus,
multinational corporations who chose not to market a product in a given
country may nonetheless prevent others from pirating the product within
that market. The net effect of the regime forces individuals in LDCs to
import the products at exorbitant prices, thereby effectively denying them
access to the goods.
At the macroscopic level the current international regime is also sub-
optimal for LDCs because it forces them to consume their natural resources
instead of conserving them. Commentators and policy makers in DCs are
often quick to criticize LDCs for their consumption strategies without
appreciating that politicians in LDCs face a dilemma. On the one hand,
they may have a desire to conserve global public goods and to appease
DCs who pressure them to conserve. On the other hand, they face
increasing internal pressure to pursue consumption strategies that
107. Id., at 432. Professor Oddi points out several flaws in this line of reasoning, including
the fact that if it is true that there are natural rights in patents, the patents should not be time
limited. However, he notes that:
Whatever may be the merits or failings of the philosophical
underpinnings of a natural rights theory of intellectual property and of
patents in particular, this theory has the greatest rhetorical power in
convincing the world community to sacrifice country-by-country
traditional instrumentalist control over intellectual property to a more
universal world standard as dictated by TRIPs.
Id. at 18.
108. See, e.g., Oddi, supra note 104, at 440.
109. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 18, at 128-130; Tejera, supra note 51, at 974.
110. The Indian Patent Act, for example, did not include patents for pharmaceutical
products. For a more thorough analysis of the Indian patent system and the exclusion of
pharmaceuticals, see Sarma, supra note 12, at 132-33. See also Weissman, supra note 44, at 1072
(noting that Brazil and Argentina used to exclude pharmaceuticals).
111. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
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maximize economic rents and raise the standard of living for their
populations. In many LDCs, expanding populations and poverty force
politicians to find ways to generate wealth. 2 Because these countries do
not have the capital to invest in infrastructure and other development
projects, they are often forced to generate rents through deforestation.113
Deforestation as a solution, however, is a band-aid. Without alternative
sources of wealth, populations will continue to grow," and pressure on
governments to destroy forests will swell.1 In order to break this cycle,
the international community must develop a new international regime that
makes conservation profitable for LDCs.
Economic motivation is crucial because even if governments in LDCs
were to ignore the pressure from local communities to deforest and instead
were to employ command and control strategies to limit consumption, they
would most probably fail. The rationale for this conclusion is that the
enforcement of laws prohibiting deforestation is nearly impossible if locals
are not cooperative. 6 If the international community could design a
regime that would make conservation profitable for LDCs, they would give
national governments both an incentive, and the resources with which, to
pursue effective conservation strategies. Given the ineffectualness of
command and control, state governments hoping to conserve their PGRs
for bio-prospectors would be motivated to allocate rents in a way that
would provide economic incentives to indigenous communities not to
deforest. These strategies could potentially include the direct distribution
of rents to communities who help bio-prospectors identify valuable PGRs,
education of indigenous communities relating to sustainable agricultural
112. See, e.g., BECHER, supra note 5, at 34-35.
113. See, e.g., Roger W. Findley, Legal and Economic Incentives for the Sustainable Use of
Rainforests 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 17, 19 (1997) ("Companies seeking to expand their mining,
logging, ranching and other activities into Indian lands were supported in 1996 by politicians
who said there was no other source of employment for the expanding population.").
114. See, e.g., CARL SAGAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENT IN PERIL 202, 225 (Anthony B. Wolbarst
ed., 1991), cited in Sharma, supra note 68, at 32 (arguing the merits of the theory of
"demographic transition," namely that the rate of population growth declines substantially
when the prosperity of a population increases); David J. Rapport, Biosphere in Distress, 15
WORLD AND I, Apr. 1, 2000, at 142.
[Plopulation booms in Asia and Africa have greatly aggravated the
problems of poverty, nutritional deficiency, and inadequate hygienic
facilities there. Today, despite the "green" revolution, two-fifths of the
world's population of six billion suffer from chronic malnutrition. Nearly
half the total population live on a per-capita income of under two dollars
per day. In addition, 1.3 billion people live without clean water, 2 billion
without proper sanitation, and 2 billion without electricity.
115. See e.g., Sharma, supra note 68, at 6-7 (noting that population growth leads to
biodiversity loss in LDCs because it increases the need for food production and shelter which
then leads to deforestation).
116. There are several reasons for this conclusion; forests are very vast and hard to patrol,
resources are scarce, and local politicians are not likely to cooperate. See, Roht-Arriaza, supra
note 19, at 928-29 ("[There is] an emerging view that indigenous and local communities can
and must be involved in resource conservation efforts .... In part, this shift in views arises
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techniques, 117 infrastructure development, and improved education:" 8 All of
which would probably help limit population growth.
The way in which the current international regime measures wealth
also increases pressure on LDCs to consume rather than conserve.
Activities such as logging and agriculture generate rents that nations can
add to their Gross Domestic Products ("GDP"). The international monetary
system "rewards" those countries that progressively increase their GDPs."9
Given the fact that many LDCs rely on these international funds, and given
that, as it stands, conservation cannot be factored into the GDP, nations
have an additional incentive to consume rather than conserve.
Despite being sub-optimal for LDCs over the long term, the current
international legal regime forces the hand of leaders in LDCs to choose
consumption strategies over conservation strategies because they are most
profitable in the short term. Through the lens of the LDC, this choice will,
with time, result in burgeoning populations,20 a shrinking supply of
resources for consumption, and decreased access to technological
"innovations."
C. The Regime is Sub-Optimal from the DC Perspective
Given the distribution of power in the international community and
the dominance of DCs, this subsection is perhaps the most important from
an instrumentalist point of view. To simply point out that DC policies are
pillaging the LDCs, while of value in the academy and on the fringes of
politics, does not usually go all that far in effectuating change. However, a
closer look at the current international regime proves that it is also sub-
optimal for DCs.
While it is true that DCs may reap greater profits in the short term by
expanding the geographic scope of their patent protection, the destruction
of the PGRs, the ecosystems that are home to them, and the indigenous
117. See, generally., BECHER, supra note 5, at 38-40.
118. While there is no guarantee that the government will use any of these tactics,
changing the incentive structure certainly increases the probability that governments will
respond in this manner.
119. See, e.g., BECHER, supra note 5, at 33-34.
A productive country sells something to other countries, either raw goods
(such as tree trunks, minerals mined from the earth, or an agricultural
product in an unprocessed form) or manufactured or processed
goods .... Traditional economic ratings do not include the value of intact
ecosystems and their resources, the functions they perform to maintain
global health, or the compounds that will eventually be discovered there
and will prove to be of great economic worth.
Findley, supra note 113, at 21 ("A further disincentive to the conservation of rainforests is the
traditional system of national income and asset accounts used to compute national gross
domestic product (GDP) and, to a significant degree, to measure the success of national
governments and their economic policies.").
120. This assumes, of course, that the government will not employ methods such as the
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communities that preserve valuable knowledge, will eventually backfire.
Initially, the strategy will dry up the pipeline for new products because
corporations will have fewer PGRs to research.12 ' Additionally, the very
stability of the world's ecosystem will be threatened by the continued
depletion of the global public goods, such as oxygen, upon which we rely
for global health.
Therefore, DCs too have an incentive to move towards an international
regime that promotes conservation. Because that means foregoing some of
the short-term profits that come from the current regime, the transition will
not be easy. But, I am not a rational choice theorist in the purest sense.
While I do believe that politicians are self-interested and will thus try to
maximize short-term utility, I do not subscribe to the theory, that
normative considerations and a desire to "look out for" future generations,
plays no part in their decision-making. The key is to "make it close." So,
proposing solutions that would entail a dismantling of the entire IP regime,
are to my mind not within the realm of realistic solutions. The IBPO
model, as I hope to show, is one that is a true "compromise" solution that
addresses the normative injustices present within the current regime,
encourages conservation, and at the same time is within the realm of what
can be accomplished by politicians.
D. Summation
Part III lays the foundation for the IBPO. It proves that the status quo
is inferior for everyone involved and sets the stage for the argument in Part
IV that a compromise solution where both LDCs and DCs have some
property claims to the products derived from PGRs is the system to which
we should aspire.
121. Sarma, supra note 12, at 112 ("[U]nless land is conserved, not only will indigenous
groups suffer, but so will transnational corporations and lesser developed countries because
they will not be able to exploit indigenous knowledge, since the knowledge would ultimately
become extinct.").
Some might argue that with time and technological advances corporations will no
longer need raw germplasm and will be able to produce pharmaceuticals and other products
synthetically, thereby eliminating the need for the preservation of biological resources. The
problem with this argument is that it ignores what many scientists have learned to be
empirically true. Natural species have evolved elegant mechanisms to adapt to their
ecosystems. Reproducing the centuries of "work" done by evolution, in a lab, has proven to
be extremely difficult. There is no reason to believe that new technologies will displace the
value of nature's work. For a scientific account of why bio-prospecting will continue to be a
valuable practice as opposed to chemical synthesis, see, Kadidal, supra note 31, 223 n.12. See
also Huft, supra note 12, at 1679 ("It has recently become apparent to many pharmaceutical
companies... that the imagination of synthetic chemists is far less creative than that of
nature..."); Tangley, supra note 28 (describing ways in which technological advances are
being combined with bio-prospecting).
2001]
23
Gulati: The "Tragedy of the Commons" in Plant Genetic Resources: The Need for a New International Regime Centered Around an International Biotechnology Patent Office
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2001
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
IV. THE POSITIVE CASE FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT OFFICE (IBPO)
A. PGRs as Limited Common Property
While scholars and policy makers have heretofore proposed a number
of amendments to the current international regime,1" none of them
succeeds in striking a workable balance between innovation and
conservation. The difficulty with the majority of approaches is that they
fail to acknowledge this tradeoff and attempt to identify one rightful owner.
In this Part, I put forward the argument that both LDCs and DCs have
property claims in products derived from PGRs. Therefore, the question to
be resolved is not, which is more important, but rather, how can both be
recognized.
Using the work of Professor Carol Rose as a starting point, I propose
that PGRs should be treated as limited common property ("LCP"), instead
of as global public goods. LCP is property that is common within a group,
but private property to anyone outside of that group."n This property
theory most closely approximates the principles articulated by Articles 15
and 16 of the CBD.124 As discussed in Part II, the patent provisions of TRIPs
have, in essence, trumped Articles 15 and 16. Consequently, PGRs
continue to be treated in the international legal regime as the "common
heritage of mankind" or as global public goods. The problem that is
readily apparent, but generally not dealt with by scholars, is that neither the
DCs nor LDCs should own the entirety of the property right. My proposal
is that there is a way in which we do not have to choose one or the other,
but rather can recognize the property interests of both groups. Before
detailing the provisions of the International Biotechnology Patent Office
model, and how it accomplishes this goal, it is important to get a clearer
sense of the way in which property rights are distributed in the current
international regime.
In the status quo, not all PGRs are treated as the "common heritage of
mankind." Only "raw" PGRs have been classified as such. Once
corporations develop commercial products from these PGRs, whether they
are pesticides, seeds, pharmaceuticals, or other products with economic
value, these end products are no longer considered the "common heritage of
mankind." Via the patent system, those products become "inventions" and
the inventors are rewarded with an individual property right. The current
international regime allocates all of the property rights, and therefore, all of
the rents derived from PGRs, to the corporation who develops the end
product. Thus, it is the DCs, who have the R & D budgets and know-how
122. See infra Part V, for a discussion of these alternatives and reasons why they are
inferior.
123. See Rose, supra note 13, at 132.
124. See supra notes 77-79.
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to "create" these end products, that are awarded the property rights,
whereas the LDCs who pay for the conservation (by not consuming) of the
PGRs, without which the end products could not be developed, are not
conferred any rights.
This allocation of property rights is problematic because it does not
reward the entity that makes the initial investment. This regime is the
equivalent of asking a country A to deposit liquid assets into a bank
account so that another country B can invest them and collect interest on
them without having a duty to share any of the profits with the country
that deposited the funds. An efficient property regime would reward B for
its skill in earning interest on the initial deposit, but would also allocate
some of the rents to country A as compensation for making the initial
investment. If the former property scheme were adopted as a rule, country
A would have no incentive to invest its liquid assets into the account and
would instead spend it, or invest it, on its own.
While this outcome seems obvious, there is very little difference
between this hypothetical and the way in which PGRs are treated in the
current international legal regime. LDCs who make the initial investment
by conserving PGRs are not rewarded for that investment. Amendments
to the status-quo regime must be such that both the "depositor" and the
"investor" are accorded property rights in the profits earned.
There is little doubt that, under international law, nations have
property rights in their natural resources. Nations typically derive rents
from the sale of natural resources such as timber, minerals, and oil. These
goods are considered private goods and thus States have property rights in
them. On the other hand, nations cannot sell the oxygen that their trees
produce, because it is a global public good rather than a private good."6
Most scholars who have considered the question of how PGRs should
be treated have concluded that PGRs have .some elements of private goods
but that they are also very similar to prototypical public goods. For
example, Roger Sedjo contends that "genetic resources have elements of
both public and private goods.... Phenotypes are subject to rivalry in
consumption .... [however,] [glenotypes exhibit non-rivalry-in the sense
that one person's consumption does not affect the amount available to
others."' While this analysis is valuable, it does not take the next step,
125. The problem with most pure public goods is boundary setting. In other words, there
is no way to allocate the property right to any individual entity. For example no entity can
"own" the oxygen that anyone breathes, or the water in the oceans. Presumably, plant genetic
resources do not have a boundary setting problem. Nonetheless, they have been treated as
global public goods in international law.
126. Sedjo, supra note 32, at 200-01.
A phenotype is the outward expression of physical characteristics. A genotype is
the set of genetic information contained in the cells of a living organism. The genotype, in
conjunction with environmental factors, determines what a living organism's phenotype will
be. Roger Sedjo uses the term's phenotype and genotype to express the idea that when a
logger consumes a tree for lumber, the tree has been consumed for its phenotype, or, the
outward physical expression of its genes. When the same tree is used as a sample from which
DNA is extracted and then developed into pesticide, the tree is used for its genotype. In the
first case, where the tree is used for lumber, no one else can use the same tree for lumber
20011
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which is to define that middle ground between public and private property
and develop structures to recognize that middle ground.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the scholars who
contend that PGRs should be treated analogously to public goods because
they are non-depleting fail to factor the IP system into their analysis. The
first person that is able to use the genotype in a way that incorporates it
into a patent gains a monopoly over the sale of that end-product. While
others could still technically use the genotype, the ways in which they can
use it are severely limited by the monopoly right granted to the "inventor."
In this sense PGRs are depleting. 
127
Genetic resources, even though they are different from oil, minerals,
timber and other "hard" resources because they are physically non-
depleting,128 share many of the characteristics that prompt us to grant
property rights to those "hard" resources in the first place. Property
scholars have argued that property rights are one of the ways in which
legal societies avoid the "tragedy of the commons." As the analysis in Part
II demonstrates, PGRs suffer from this problem. Therefore, property rights
might theoretically be created as a solvency mechanism. In that sense, the
PGRs are no different from oil, minerals, or trees. Additionally, as the
analysis above suggests, their use is rivalrous in the sense that once the first
person uses the resource in an end-product and patents the product, the
economic value of the PGR decreases significantly. If PGRs are thought of
as lottery tickets, each time somebody discovers a ticket, they make sure
that no one else collects the profits from that ticket.
Thus, the more fundamental question is-who owns the tickets?, and
who should get a share of the winnings? In the case of land that may hold
minerals or oil, international law grants the bundle of property rights to the
host nation. In the case of plants that may hold valuable genetic resources,
international law grants the right to the first person to gain a patent in an
end-product.29 This system of unitary allocation is illogical and, as
demonstrated in Part II, fails to solve the "tragedy of the commons" in
PGRs. As Carol Rose notes, "certain property claims do not make it onto
our property radar screen, or appear only dimly there. At best this pattern
creates an imbalance in favor of the kinds of claims we do recognize, while
at worst it may foster violence and dissipate wealth."13"
because the resource has been physically depleted. In the case of a tree being sampled for its
genotype, as second person could sample the tree and then use that sample to develop a
pesticide as well. Thus, the use of the phenotype is depleting, while the use of the genotype is
non-depleting.
127. See, e.g., Odek, supra note 12, at 156 ("[with regard to genetic resources] the value of
the whole is present in even minimal amounts.").
128. See, e.g., Huft, supra note 12, at 1726-27; Sharma, supra note 68, at 28.
129. Just because the western "inventors" add value does not deny the property right of
the host nations. Building upon the comparison to oil, just because a western inventor
develops a process for refining and using the oil for commercial purposes, does not deny the
country of origin a right to recover compensation for oil extracted as a natural resource. In
some sense, both the "inventor" and the host nation have a property claim in the oil that is
commercially sold.
130. Rose, supra note 13, at 143.
[Vol. 4
26
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 4 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol4/iss1/3
2001] Plant Genetic Resources
Agreeing with this analysis, many have suggested treating PGRs as
private goods. Most of these proposals have been primarily normative and
few have attempted to explain the pragmatic implications of such a choice.
A system that would treat PGRs as pure private goods would fail because
it would be difficult to determine some principled way in which to allocate
the property rights amongst individuals within a state,3' and it would not
give the government an incentive to promote policies that would increase
conservation. 132  Realizing this, most pragmatic scholars treat these
arguments as a sword against the normativists. However, there is a third
alternative-limited common property.
As limited common property, no individual owner within a country
has to be identified in order to create and recognize a property right;
instead, the right could be granted to the government. 13   Many scholars
who have written on the topic have proposed that granting property rights
to governments would be sub-optimal. They argue that some corrupt
131. Granting individual's or indigenous communities property rights in PGRs is
extremely problematic, for several reasons. First it is not clear how the rights would be fairly
allocated amongst and within the indigenous communities. As Michael Huft notes:
[Tihe knowledge of medicinal plants also has characteristic distribution
patterns across traditional societies. Some plants may be known only to a
single healer or a single village within a region, while others may be
known to shamans and herbalists in more than one tribe in a region. Still
others are known throughout entire countries of subcontinental areas.
The determination of the distribution of the knowledge held in societies is
complicated, however, by the problem of identifying the group of people
who hold the knowledge.
Huft, supra note 12, at 1702-03. Second, even if an individual or community were to have
property rights, it is not clear that the property right would be a sufficient incentive for
conservation. PGRs are like lottery tickets. The vast majority of PGRs will turn out to be of no
commercial value. But the ones that do have value will have tremendous commercial value.
Thus, suppose that a community is granted property rights over 100 acres of land. The
mathematical probability that a bio-prospector will find a ticket in that area might be in the
order of 1 in 1000. Even though the rents, if a ticket were found, would be much greater than
the rents from consumption, many communities may opt for the "sure thing" given the small
probability of finding a successful product and the time it might take to actually earn returns.
If the property right were vested in the country, however, the land area would be maximized.
This maximizes the chances of finding "a lottery ticket" and therefore makes conservation a
more rational choice. It also allows cross-subsidization. Therefore, the government can
compensate a community that is not fortunate enough to have a "lucky ticket" for conserving,
nonetheless. This allows the community to satisfy its short-term needs, while waiting for a
ticket to be discovered within their community. See, e.g., Craig D. Jacoby & Charles Weiss,
Recognizing Property Rights in Traditional Biocultural Knowledge, 16 STAN. EVNTL. L.J. 74, 87
(1997) ("If resource providers could charge for their resources, their compensation would
likely be limited by market forces reflecting the small chance that any given sample will lead
to a marketable product and the expensive research and development process required to
commercialize products.").
132. Even if there were a way in which property rights could be equitably allocated to
individuals or communities and even if the individuals and/or communities were to have an
incentive to conserve, bypassing the government is a poor strategic decision. Ultimately, it is
the government in many LDCs that will make decisions such as whether or not loggers can
log a certain area of the rain forest. If conservation is not profitable for the government, the
government has an incentive to consume, rather than conserve.
133. Treating PGRs as LCP and granting the property rights to the States would not
nr h tip thorn from tipqionino intornAl cvqtpm' to allorate thmop rents.
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governments in LDCs might simply keep the rents and not distribute them
to the indigenous communities that live in the forests and whose
knowledge in many cases helped the bio-prospectors make their
discoveries. 134 This argument ignores the fact that, whatever the motivation
of the elites, it would be illogical for the State to act in this manner. If
governments did not reward indigenous communities for conservation and
for their contributions to bio-prospectors, conservation efforts at the local
level would fail for the reasons detailed in Part II (namely, the
ineffectiveness of command and control enforcement, and the need to
generate wealth in order to curb population growth).135 In this sense, PGRs
are different from goods such as oil and minerals because the government
needs the cooperation of indigenous communities to ensure that they are
conserved.'3
134. Naomi Roht:Arriaza gives four reasons why property rights should not be entrusted
with the State but rather should be granted to indigenous communities: first, states don't
generally protect the rights of indigenous communities; second, there is no evidence that the
benefits will be distributed to indigenous communities; third, the money will be lost in the
bureaucracy; and fourth, resources are most likely to be conserved if communities are
invested and involved in their stewardship. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 19, at 948.
135. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
136. Under the most pessimistic view, a corrupt government would keep all of the rents
for its own short-term gain. There are two responses that can be made to this scenario. The
first is that in this case, little can be done. Some might suggest circumventing the government
and granting royalties directly to the people. The problem with this argument is that the
proposed solution doesn't take into account the problem. If the government is completely
corrupt and interested in short-term individual gain only, it is implausible that it would not
intervene in such a scheme. Second, if one assumes that the government is corrupt but wants
to maximize its long-term prosperity, then the allocation of rents to the government might not
be a poor strategic move. This argument seems counterintuitive. However, it is important to
remember that plant genetic resources are not like oil in one important sense-their value is in
their genotype and not in their phenotype. A corrupt government could keep all the rents
from the international sale of oil without the fear that indigenous communities would deplete
the oil. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that command and control policies to enforce
conservation over vast areas of land are almost impossible. See id. They are also not very
effective at controlling population growth. Therefore, without cooperating with indigenous
communities, even the most corrupt and authoritarian governments will have a hard time
preventing deforestation. Thus, if the corrupt government wants to maximize its long-term
rents, it would have an incentive to distribute some of the rents within the indigenous
communities. See, e.g., Tilford, supra note 22, at 441 ("Conservation is much more efficient if
locals stand to benefit. The genetic resource issue in particular does not conjure up images of
countries so fat from compensation received that they can afford to fend off an unwilling
populace from the resource preserves.").
Additionally, if the elites value long-term profits, the prospect of keeping all of the
profits from commercial end products derived from PGRs, as opposed to a small part of the
profits, will be an incentive to invest in technological development. See Daniel J. Goldstein,
Molecular Biology and the Protection of Germplasm: A Matter of National Security, in SEEDS AND
SOVEREIGNTY supra note 3, at 327-29 (arguing that even if national elites reap short-term gains
from bioprospecting royalties, they realize the tremendous upside that could be had in the
long run if they were to patent the technologies themselves, and therefore they may invest in
scientific research and technology in order to realize those larger gains).
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B. The IBPO as a LCP Solution
Establishing that PGRs should be treated as LCP is a starting point.
The challenge is to take this theoretical argument and to devise a structural
solution that will allow this right to have meaning. Allocating rents to two
entities for the "same" property is complex, but it is the challenge of this
Note. Proposals made thus far in the literature do not take this step.
The reasons scholars articulate for why PGRs are different from other
"hard resources" illustrate my point. There are three principal arguments
made along these lines: (1) PGRs once they are discovered, can be
synthesized in the laboratory, (2) the value of the property is hard to
measure because it is not proportional to the amount used3 and, (3) it
would be prohibitively expensive for countries to monitor their plants and
ensure that they were not being used by bio-prospectors. 13 While these are
all good points, the conclusion drawn from these arguments is that there
must be no property right in PGRs. That conclusion is erroneous. What
these arguments suggest is not that there is no property right, but rather
that the property rights, if they exist, are hard to enforce within the current
international legal regime.
All of these problems can be solved by a system that recognizes a
property right in PGRs and allocates compensation at the "back end." This is
true because the use of the property does not necessarily hurt the host
nation until it is incorporated into an end-product that is patented. In
other words, the property right is only valuable when the property is used
to derive commercial profit. If the property is used and not patented, it
remains in the "global commons" and there is no reason for the host
country to want to exercise its property claim over the PGRs. On the other
hand, if the property is being incorporated into an end-product that is
patented, presumably for future commercial use, and is therefore being
taken out of the global commons, then the host nation should be
compensated as the initial investors. Therefore, a contractual duty to
allocate a portion of the profits derived from a patent based on PGRs
should be attached to a grant of a patent right. Drawing back to the
example of the deposited funds, the country that makes the deposits has a
property claim over some of the profits made by the investing country.
This "back end" system would allow both the host country and the
"inventor" from the DC to have a property right in the product. One could
conceivably create a system in which every country would agree to take
the contribution of PGRs into account when granting a patent on an end-
product derived from a PGR, and to force patent holders to pay a royalty to
the host country. Such a system would be inefficient and very difficult to
enforce because each state would have a strong incentive to protect its
137. See, e.g., Huft, supra note 12, at 1726-27.
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., Jacoby & Weiss, supra note 131, at 93 (noting that the costs of policing and
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nationals by violating the law.
Therefore, I propose that all biotechnology patents in which the end-
product is derived from a PGR should be referred by domestic patent
offices to an International Biotechnology Patent Office (IBPO) that will be
created by an international treaty. All signatory nations would agree to
refer any biotechnology patent applications for end products derived from
PGRs to the IBPO. The basic framework for the IBPO would be as
follows:4 '
1. The IBPO will grant patents to end products derived
from PGRs applying standards similar to the ones used in
the United States and Europe.
2. All nations will agree to honor and enforce the decisions
made by the IBPO in their national courts.
3. The IBPO will take into account the contributions of
PGRs in the development of biotechnology products and
will determine a royalty to be paid to LDCs based on the
contribution made by the PGR to the final product. The
royalty will be greater if indigenous communities
contributed knowledge to the bio-prospectors.
4. The IBPO will have its own standards that will be
established in its charter, and an arbitral body will settle
disputes. The IBPO will sustain itself financially based on
the fees that will be collected when patent applications are
filed.
I propose that the IBPO should, with time, work to add the following
provisions:
5. The IBPO will test the ecological danger of a
biotechnological product before granting a patent. Using a
process similar to the one used by the FDA for the
approval of pharmaceuticals in the United States, the IBPO
will conduct research tests to test the ecological safety of
the product.'41 The IBPO will not only require an approval
process for pharmaceuticals, but also for other bio-
engineered products such as agricultural products. Given
the destruction that these products may cause when
140. The IBPO would apply prospectively and would not be retroactive to any patents
filed before the date upon which it was operational and prepared to handle patent
applications.
141. States would be allowed to enact higher standards domestically but will not be
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introduced into an ecosystem, it is important that there be
some global regulation and approval process for bio-
engineered products to ensure their safety.142
6. In order to maintain a patent right in a country the
patent holder must make the goods available for sale in
that nation.
C. Problems and Explanations
Convincing rational political leaders to cede authority to an
international patent office for a set of patents that are as important a part of
the economy as biotechnology patents are to the economies of the DCs will
no doubt be difficult. As Professor Gutterman notes:
Resolving the "North-South" debate regarding IP
rights will necessarily demand a good deal of political
courage from all parties. Little doubt exists that
cooperation with foreign concerns, however well meaning,
can be extremely dangerous for political leaders in many
developing countries. Similarly, a program perceived as
drawing funds and jobs outside of developed countries
like the United States.... will surely draw criticism from a
variety of interests. Nonetheless, such a long term
investment must be made on both sides if the theoretical
relationship between economic development and the
sanctity of IP rights is finally to be realized.43
Even though the ratification of the IBPO would expend a great deal of
political capital, it presents the best compromise solution available to both
LDCs and DCs. It allows DCs to have strong worldwide patent protection
for their products, while allowing LDCs who provided the PGRs, and often
a part of the knowledge, to collect some of the rents. This system would
allow corporations to file one patent instead of incurring the transaction
142. While a full discussion of the ecological dangers that may stem from the overzealous
granting of patents to biotechnological inventions is beyond the scope of this Note, this is a
critical issue that deserves more thoughtful analysis in the literature and amongst policy
makers. See, e.g., Tilford, supra note 22, at 393-97 (suggesting that advances in biotechnology
will ultimately cause more harm than good because gene erosion will ultimately break down
food security); Ritchie et al., supra note 101, at 446-7 (describing a project at a major American
University in which a biotechnological product in its final stages of development was found to
be destructive to the Nitrogen cycle of plants and could have led to widespread decertification
if it had been introduced into the environment). But see, e.g., Jacoby & Weiss, supra note 138,
at 86 (arguing that biotechnology has increased crop yields thus decreasing the food shortage
and lessening pressure for deforestation).
143 GittPrrnan ,.upra nntP 37, at 139
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costs of going from country to country." While it does force them to share
some of their profits in the short term, it increases the chances that LDCs
will enforce their property rights in their own jurisdiction.
Additionally, in the long term it increases the chances that they will
have a continuous supply of PGRs with which to develop profitable end-
products. LDCs will benefit by receiving rents in recognition of their
property .rights in PGRs. These rents will boost their Gross Domestic
Product and give them a stronger incentive to devise strategies to conserve
PGRs.
From the perspective of the "global community" the proposed system
will increase conservation and help preserve biodiversity. It will also
foster the continued innovation and development of new end-products
derived from PGRs such as pharmaceuticals.
The model I have proposed is by no means complete. Many of the
unanswered questions will have to be worked out by governments through
negotiation and compromise. There are a few issues, however, that should
be addressed here.
Initially, the IBPO will have to overcome certain collective action
problems. The first problem will be bringing all of the states together to act
cooperatively. A collective action problem arises if nations "hold out" and
refuse to sign the treaty unless certain concessions are made to them.
Because the system can't succeed unless states participate, there is an
incentive to defect out of any coalition that might form. This concern is
valid but can be overcome.
The nations can be brought together to negotiate the IBPO in a round
of GATT negotiations. Because the formation of the IBPO would
necessitate the replacement of the TRIPs, it would be appropriate to use
GATT negotiations as a forum for the implementation of the IBPO. If the
IBPO were to be implemented as an amendment to TRIPs, it would be tied
to the GATT. Just as TRIPs succeeded because it was wrapped up in
GATT, the IBPO can follow the same course. One could argue that tying
the IBPO to the GATT where DCs have more bargaining power will lead to
an agreement biased in favor of DCs. While this argument has merit, it
144. See, e.g., Scalise & Nugent, supra note 43, at 105 (noting that there are tremendous
costs associated with filing, and prosecuting patents in multiple jurisdictions with different
rules and that "[tihe proposition that a uniform system for recognizing international patent
rights would reduce a great deal of the waste and inefficiency is unchallenged"); Michael
North, Note, The U.S. Expansion of Patentable Subject Matter: Creating a Competitive Advantage for
Multinational Companies?, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 111, 114-15 (2000) (arguing for a uniform
patentable subject matter standard for Japan, Europe and the United States); Sherwood, supra
note 99, at 522-28 (noting that patent offices in many LDCs are ill equipped, have poorly
trained personnel, and have other disadvantages that will make it extremely difficult for them
to scale up to the sophisticated system that compliance with TRIPs requires). Sherwood also
notes that the system is inefficient because countries that invest resources in conducting
technical examinations for patents, could save money if someone else were to do the research
for them. Id. at 527. The IBPO helps LDCs by removing the burden of having to invest in a
sophisticated biotechnology patent infrastructure, and it helps the DCs by ensuring that they
will have a neutral forum that is well staffed and well equipped to process their application in
a timely, efficient, and equitable manner.
[Vol. 4
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must be qualified by the fact that the IBPO is, by definition, a compromise
solution. If the DCs want to leverage their bargaining power to get more
favorable terms for themselves, they will not give up TRIPs. If we start
with the supposition that DCs realize that TRIPs is a sub-optimal solution,
then we can assume that they will not over-leverage their bargaining
power to create an imbalanced IBPO agreement.
With regard to who would make the initial monetary investment to
establish the IBPO, employing a contribution system that would collect
funds in an escrow during a transition period can solve the problem. The
transition period will be necessary to allow nations to modify their
domestic systems in order to comply with the terms of the treaty. During
that period, after a treaty has been signed but before the office receives its
first patent application, an escrow account would be set up into which a
fixed fee would have to be deposited. The fee would be uniform across
nations and would be charged to a corporation each time that it sought a
patent in any state for an end-product derived from PGRs.14 The money
from the escrow could then be used to finance the creation of the IBPO and
to fund it to the point where it was self-sustaining. A group of leaders
could be assembled, representing various signatory nations, to oversee the
implementation of the IBPO. This scheme ensures that no state "free rides"
off of the investment of any other state.
A second potential issue that deserves attention is how the IBPO will
be governed. The rules for the IBPO, including the patent standards, will
be established by the treaty and amended by subsequent rounds of the
GATT. The administrators and the patent examiners should be selected
from diverse jurisdictions and trained in the guidelines of the IBPO. The
treaty will establish their compensation. Initially they will be paid by the
escrowed funds and later by the filing fees. In order to ensure that there is
no bias, the name of the corporation and its national origin will be left off
of the patent application when the examiner is reviewing it. Additionally,
a corporation that is denied a patent will be given reasons why the patent
was denied and will have the opportunity either to re-file and/or to
appeal. There will be an appellate body made up of a diverse membership
representing both LDCs and DCs. Appeals could be designed similar to
most international commercial arbitrations in which panels of three
arbitrators from diverse jurisdictions hear the appeal and make a binding
decision. Additionally, since granting a patent to the end-product would
represent a net gain for both the DCs and LDCs (because they both profit
from the granting of a patent), bias in favor of, or against, granting patents
should not become an issue.
A third issue is enforcement. States will have to enforce the decisions
of the IBPO by cracking down on pirates, guarantee that patent
applications filed for products derived from PGRs are forwarded to the
IBPO, and ensure that royalties are paid in adherence with the IBPO rules.
145. If one corporation filed for a patent on the same product in multiple countries, they
wvould be requir-d to nay the f(P P h timp.. . .. . _ _ . . . . F -1, M -- a - - - - -
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States could be coerced into complying with these enforcement duties by
the threat of penalties and sanctions within the IBPO itself, and, if
necessary, by tying in the WTO. This formidable punishment would serve
as a strong incentive for states to comply.
One final issue that should be discussed is the pricing model. The
IBPO will be entrusted with the responsibility of determining the royalty
rates that should be paid to host nations. This duty will be challenging.
The market prices most property. In other words, when there is a single
owner who has control over his property right, he can sell the property for
its market value. The way in which this international system has been
designed, both LDCs and DCs are accorded property rights in the end-
products. However, both do not have control. Thus, the IBPO, and not the
market, has the responsibility of pricing the value of the property right. In
order to be fair and maintain consistency, there should be a relatively
narrow "royalty range" or band, that would differ from patent to patent. 14
The royalty rate should be a percentage of the revenues147 collected on a
certain product, for the duration of the patent. Thus, the more the end
product earns as it is sold on the market, the more the initial investors, or
LDCs, collect."u
146. The range is kept narrow first because it is assumed that most bio-prospectors relied
on some form of indigenous knowledge and second because a narrow range minimizes the
potential for bias.
147. I use percentage of revenues instead of percentage of profits because determining
how much profit was made by a particular product would pose more of an actuarial mess.
148. The IBPO would initially hire expert accountants and economists to determine what
the royalty range should be. Those individuals would be entrusted to develop a model that
would incorporate several variables including the following: the average of the total rents
collected from all "conservation" activities by LDCs in the status quo, the average of the total
rents collected from all "consumption" activities, and the level of expected profit that induces
corporations to develop end products from PGRs. Calculating each of these variables would
be very complex. One way in which to make the calculations would be to standardize the
pricing to a given area. For example, the group would attempt to determine how much a
State can earn by consuming the next acre of land, A, then determine how much they can earn
by saving that acre (without deriving rents from PGRs), B. Next, they would attempt to
calculate the chance that that acre would have a valuable PGR, C, and then they would
determine the average revenues earned on a PGR that receives a patent, D. If X is the "royalty
range," the formula to determine X would be as follows: A-B < (C)(D)(X). If X is such that this
equation is satisfied, LDCs would have an incentive to conserve, rather than consume. The
reason X is a range, and not a set rate, is because those "inventions" that relied heavily on
indigenous knowledge should have to pay a higher royalty rate than those that did not rely
on an indigenous knowledge because the LDC has made a greater "investment." The royalty
rate should be higher if the indigenous communities have contributed to the invention
because their contributions have saved the corporation time and money, and because their
contributions are "labor" that should be rewarded. See, e.g., Odek, supra note 12, at 155;
Sarma, supra note 12, at 113.
If it turns out that X is so large so as to create a disincentive to corporations to invest
in the development of end-products derived from PGRs, DCs will have to cooperate with
LDCs to adjust B. By arguing that B should be adjusted, I am suggesting that the
governments of DCs will have to provide economic incentives to LDCs to conserve, in
addition to the incentives stemming from the IBPO model. These incentives, such as debt-for-
nature swaps, would increase B, thereby making X smaller. Given that corporations have a
strong incentive in the status quo to bio-prospect and develop products despite the fact that
their products are pirated in many LDCs, it is not likely that their incentives will decrease
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It is important here to note that other mechanisms that compensate
LDCs for conservation cannot be successful replacements for the IBPO
model. Initially, they are normatively inferior in that they allow the
pillaging of indigenous knowledge to continue without compensation.
Additionally, ithas been empirically proven that alternatives such as debt-
for-nature swaps, which require DCs to forgive loans to LDCs in exchange
for conservation, have been very difficult, if not impossible, to execute
successfully. Such measures are not market mechanisms and require
government to government transfers, rather than corporation to government
transfers.
This is problematic for two reasons. First, it faces a tremendous
collective action problem. Determining which DC should have to exchange
debt-for-nature, and how much of a burden each should each bear is nearly
impossible given the compelling incentive to free-ride.4 9 The second
problem that these arrangements create is political. Even though these
monetary incentives would be a way for DCs to pay for their share of global
public goods, they are perceived by the electorate and by many politicians
as charity. As such, they are politically unpopular within the DCs.'-
V. WHY THE IBPO IS A SUPERIOR POLICY OPTION
Before concluding that the IBPO is the superior policy option, it is
important to critique the other proposals for reform that have been
forwarded by scholars and policy makers. There have been almost as
many different proposals as there have been articles written on this issue.
Since many of these proposals are slight variations on each other, the focus
of this Part will be to concentrate on the general themes that can be found
in the literature.
A. Direct Contracting
The first proposed alternative is for nations, or indigenous groups, to
directly contract with corporations wishing to bio-prospect on their lands.
This alternative is based on the Coasean theory of "internalizing
externalities" through direct negotiation. 5' An inefficient market outcome
due to the existence of externalities may be corrected through negotiation
amongst the affected parties if the transaction costs are not prohibitive.
Proponents of this model might argue that the IBPO is an unnecessary
"middle man."
While this alternative is appealing because it relies upon the market
significantly under the new regime.
149. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 11 at 594 ("There are, however, many impediments... that
hinder cooperative solutions to public goods provisions, particularly where, as in the
international arena, there is no authoritative central authority.").
150. See, e.g., Tilford, supra note 22, at 443 (noting that transfer programs are perceived as
"foreign aid" and that there is little political will for such actions).
151. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost. 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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and circumvents the need for an international regulatory framework such
as the IBPO, it is problematic for several reasons. The primary concern that
this approach brings to the fore is one that is common to Coasean
contracts-while Coasean contracts do "internalize the externalities," they
do not account for the distribution of rents within the contractual
relationship. 52 Given the combination of the economic strength and
experience of many multinationals and the relative inexperience and need
for short-term economic help of many LDCs, most contracts of this nature
will be heavily biased in favor of the corporations."5 3 The consequence is
that while the multinational may gain the opportunity to bio-prospect in a
small portion of land, from the perspective of the nation-state, the
incentives for consumption will probably remain higher than the incentives
for a conservation strategy. The distributional inequality also exists with
respect to knowledge. The multinational corporation, because of its
familiarity with the commercial market and the potential value of certain
resources, will inevitably know more about what they are "purchasing"
than the government with whom they are negotiating.M
One could argue that this inequality in bargaining power will be
balanced, in part, by competition amongst purchasers. However, even if
LDCs did attempt to leverage their land to different bio-prospectors, their
ability to do so would be limited. Most of the world's PGRs have still not
been researched. As a consequence, if one LDC tries to contract at a high
price, another LDC can draw away the multinational by offering a lower
price."5 The only way to solve this collective action problem would be for
LDCs to form a coalition, much like OPEC.'-6 The transaction costs of
forming this kind of coalition would be high and the incentive for any
individual nation to defect would be greater than the incentive to stay in
the coalition.15 7 As a consequence, the costs of devising an enforcement
mechanism to keep countries in the coalition would be high."
152. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982).
153. See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 4, at 960 ("[Plarties to the deal have vastly different
resources, abilities to bargain, and abilities to enforce the provisions of any agreement.").
154. See, e.g., id. at 960; Odek, supra note 12, at 170-71.
These problems are particularly profound if the property rights are granted to
indigenous communities. In those cases, the indigenous communities will be greatly
disadvantaged in bargaining power vis-6-vis the large multinationals. Additionally, the
private contracts, if they are negotiated with indigenous communities, leave open the question
of who should negotiate on behalf of the community and who should receive the rewards.
This is especially problematic in situations where the genetic resource, such as the Neem tree,
can be found in many communities.
155. See, e.g., Bosselmann, supra note 38, at 144 ("[Flaced with paying for germplasm,
biotechnology companies may seek out LDCs that are less strict in their control over access to
germplasm.").
156. OPEC is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; an intergovernmental
organization that that helps determine the conditions for the export of oil. There have been
some attempts made to form genetic cartels of this sort. The Cartagena Agreement on Access
to Genetic Resources was signed between the nations of Bolivia, Columbia, Venezuela,
Ecuador and Peru. The agreement requires prospectors to negotiate agreements before
prospecting in any of the countries. See Tilford, supra note 22, at 437.
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There are also other transaction costs that make the market solution
problematic. Given the political instability in many LDCs, multinationals
may be afraid of making up-front commitments.159 If making a deal
requires a company to commit resources up-front, they would presumably
be very wary of negotiating with a government that was, in their opinion,
corrupt or unstable for fear of losing their investment in the event of
political instability.
Those who advocate the Coasean approach usually rebut these
arguments by suggesting that the Merck-INBio agreement is empirical
evidence that the market approach can be successful.16 The Merck-INBio
agreement was signed between Merck, a pharmaceutical giant, and INBio,
a Costa Rican private non-profit institute created by the Costa Rican
government."' The deal was structured to allow Merck scientists to take
extracts from plants, insects, and microorganisms in exchange for
technology transfers and royalty payments. While the exact terms of the
deal are not public, 162 there has been a great deal of speculation as to what
the terms of the agreement were, with many commentators suggesting that
the Costa Rican government did not get a "fair bargain."
16
Even if one was to ignore the distributional problems in the Merck-
INBio agreement, Costa Rica is not representative of many LDCs. Costa
Rica has an adult literacy rate of ninety eight percent, a well-developed
business and scientific community, has been committed to environmental
conservation, and has had a stable democratic government throughout the
twentieth century.M These factors lower the transaction costs of an
agreement.1 6' It is not surprising, therefore, that the Merck-INBio
agreement has not been followed up by many new agreements.
The third problem with these agreements is that they have been limited
159. It is known that Merck paid approximately one million dollars up front as a
prospector's fee in its deal with INBio. See, e.g., Kadidal, supra note 31, at 233.
160. While Merck/INBio is the most prevalently cited example, there have been other
agreements between DCs and LDCs. See, e.g., Tilford, supra note 22, at 431. The problems with
the Merck/INBio deal also infect these other agreements.
161. See, e.g., Parlange, supra note 4, at 42.
162. The royalty rate is generally assumed to be somewhere between one and three
percent.
163. See, e.g., SHIVA, supra note 96, at 76 ("[Playments are supposed to build research
capacity in the source country. But when Merck supplied chemical extraction equipment to
the University of Costa Rica, it ensured that it has exclusive commercial use of those facilities.
The capacity building is thus held 'captive' by the financing corporation and is not available
for the wider national interest in the source country."); Tilford, supra note 22, at 432-33 (noting
that Merck's reluctance to give Costa Rica technology that would allow it to conduct its own
research is a product of Merck's reluctance to "create in Costa Rica a full partner and potential
future competitor possessing its own resource base"); Kadidal, supra note 31, at 235 ("All
things considered, a deal as one sided as Merck's appears to be the result of a severe
imbalance in bargaining power."). But see Sharma, supra note 68, at 30 (describing the
agreement as a successful operation of market forces).
164. See Tilford, supra note 22, at 433.
165. See, e.g., id., at.433 ("These conditions might buy for Costa Rica what other countries
simply cannot afford: the time and inclination to wait, to bypass immediate resource-
depleting income to gamble on future, possibly larger returns. Equitable or not, the
Merck/NBio dea! might hqvp little chanre nf -uirviving in mn't nther developing countries.").
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to pharmaceutical bio-prospecting. Yet, as this Note has shown, there are
many other products, such as seeds, chemicals, and pesticides, which are
also developed using bio-prospecting techniques. States would
presumably have to contract with these corporations as well. This presents
two issues. Initially, as an empirical matter, there is no evidence that any
non-pharmaceutical companies have made such arrangements with LDCs.
Additionally, it is unclear how more than one corporation may be able to
bio-prospect in a given area if they are searching for different types of
products.
Fourth, there are enforcement problems. If an LDC contracts with
several corporations in several different states, it will have to bear the cost
of monitoring its agreement worldwide. Even when a violation is detected,
the LDC would be forced to litigate its claims in a state in which the
corporate entity has assets. Not only would this litigation be costly, but
there would also be a great deal of uncertainty stemming from the fact that
national courts will inevitably be biased in favor of their nationals.
Finally, it may not be a coincidence that the Merck agreement
"appeared on the scene at the same time as the Rio Convention."'6 Merck,
as a large pharmaceutical corporation, had a great deal to lose if the United
States were to accept the terms of the CBD. Therefore, the agreement with
INBio may have been an aberration; an exception designed to demonstrate
that market mechanisms were solving that which governments were
looking to regulate. 167 David Tilford notes that
[Olne gets the sense at present that their magnanimity
is fueled more by a desire for good publicity than out of
necessity. U.S. industry continues to stand in a uniquely
dual situation: they go hunting in Convention territory,
but retire with their spoils to the last bastion of common
heritage."
B. Granting IPRs to Government's or Indigenous Communities
The second general category of reform proposals suggests that IPRs in
raw germplasm should be granted to either indigenous communities'69 or
166. Kadidal, supra note 31, at 232.
167. Richard Godown, President of the International Biotechnology Association in
reference to the Convention on Biological Diversity argued that the Merck/lNBio agreement
was possible without the Convention's "enormous slug of mandatory contract language." See
Tilford, supra note 22, at 432.
168. Id. at 431-32.
169. See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 19 (arguing that indigenous communities should be
granted IP rights in germplasm); Huft, supra note 12 (arguing that the US patent model may
be adaptable to incorporate indigenous communities as co-inventors).
For specific criticisms of Huft's joint inventor proposal, see Jacoby & Weiss, supra
note 131, at 98, who argue that "if the contribution to the innovation was merely providing
knowledge that was in the public domain, the contribution may not merit inventorship status.
[Vol. 4
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state governments.' 70Assigning IPRs to germplasm is an inferior solution
for several reasons.
First, the standards for "intellectual contribution" would be difficult to
determine. Therefore, establishing a set of principles for separating that
germplasm to which IPRs should be assigned from non-patentable
germplasm would be extremely difficult and, to my mind, arbitrary.
Second, if PGRs were patented they would presumably last for a fixed
period of time, probably not more than the seventeen-year term granted in
the current international regime. Thus, in the best-case scenario, the
proposal would create a seventeen-year moratorium during which IPRs in
PGRs would be recognized. After the end of the seventeen-year period,
however, all of the world's PGRs would fall back into the public domain.
Third, it is not clear who the rightful owners of the IPRs should be. The
IPRs model is designed with the assumption that an individual or
individual entity will own the IPR. The majority of scholars who have
proposed granting IPRs to germplasm have suggested that the State not be
entrusted with these rights.171 Aside from the problems with bypassing the
State discussed in Part III, and to which I will return shortly, it is not clear
whether the IPRs should be held by indigenous communities as a group,
the leaders of those communities, the individuals within the communities
who might have filed for the patent, or the individuals most
knowledgeable with the use of the plant (such as shamans for medicinal
plants, or farmers for other agricultural plants).1"
The fourth difficulty that an IPR system presents has to do with
transaction costs. The management of IPRs is difficult. Patents are only
valuable in the commercial sense in two ways; if they are sold or licensed
to another owner, or if they are used to prevent entry by competitors into a
defined commercial market. Given that LDCs generally lack the
technology to turn their germplasm into marketable end-products, 73 their
only option for extracting rents from their IPRs would be to sell their
Second, a contributor must demonstrate a conceptual connection between the information
provided by the contributor and the ultimate end use of the innovation."
170. See, e.g., Kadidal, supra note 31 (arguing that the Rio Convention should be
interpreted to grant IP rights to LDCs by amending patent law to eliminate the distinctions
within the western patent system that make the patenting of germplasm difficult).
171. See e.g., Odek, supra note 12, at 36; Kadidal, supra note 31. The problem with giving
all of the intellectual property rights to the national government is that it assumes bio-
prospecting is a constant. See Kadidal, supra note 31, at 258 ("we must assume that most
pharmaceutical biodiversity resources would be developed regardless of the scope of Rio
patents."). If a pharmaceutical company bioprospects, discovers that a plant may be valuable
and then tries to purchase the IPR from the national government, the government will be able
to hold out for a very high price. This would be a tremendous disincentive to the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies considering bio-prospecting. If they attempt to
bargain up-front, before doing any research, by purchasing the patent rights to all of the
plants in a given area, all of the problems with private contracts become applicable. See supra
notes 160-179 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Arriaza, supra note 19, at 957.
173. If they did have this technology, they would be producing more end-products then
tho are prodhicing in the stah; nun-
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patents." If the State were to be granted the IPR, all of the problems that
applied to Coasean private contracting arrangements would apply here.
Alternatively, if an individual or group of individuals could be
identified as owners of the IPR, the differentials in bargaining power
between the indigenous groups and corporations would superimpose
themselves onto these contracts as well. In addition, indigenous
communities, or individuals, would probably benefit less from the IPR
than they would from deforestation. If indigenous communities were to
have IPRs in germplasm, they would likely have to shift many, if not all, of
their scarce resources to pay for the patent litigation.m
Most germplasm turns out not to be commercially valuable.' 7 Yet, this
knowledge usually only becomes known after a great deal of research and
development. Because indigenous communities do not have these R&D
capabilities, they would have to secure IPRs in a great deal of their
germplasm in order to ensure that any germplasm that turned out to be
commercially valuable would have been patented. This would burden
communities with an astronomical up-front cost. In addition, even if the
IPRs of the indigenous communities were infringed by bio-prospectors, it
would be very difficult for indigenous communities to monitor and detect
the violations. It would be even more arduous for them to bear the cost of
litigating their complaints. The combination of these two factors suggests
that owning 1IPRs in PGRs would probably be less beneficial to indigenous
communities than scholars have recognized.
One could argue that these transactional problems could be
sidestepped by adopting a default rule in which all PGRs are assumed to
be patented upon the signing of an international treaty. The most obvious
problem with this "solution" is the expiration problem already discussed.
Namely, that the treaty would therefore become a seventeen-year
moratorium after which all PGRs would fall back into the public domain.
C. The Private Property Model
One proposal that is a slight variation on these last two models is
introduced by Jacoby and Weiss.7 These scholars, recognizing some of the
aforementioned limitations of proposals to allocate IPRs to indigenous
communities, suggest that traditional property rights be allocated to these
174. See Kadidal, supra note 31, at 236 ("[A] drug company could protect its investments in
specific biodiversity research by negotiating an exclusive licensing agreement with an LDC
that would allow the company to enjoin its competitors from using that genetic resource."). In
rejecting the Merck/INBio option, Kadidal concludes that the problem with Merck-INBio is "a
severe imbalance in bargaining power." Kadidal fails to explain why the same differential in
bargaining power that makes prospecting contracts inferior would not apply to the system in
which the nations would hold IPRs. With respect to bargaining power, there is little
difference between the two systems.
175. See generally, Roht-Arriaza, supra note 19, at 957.
176. See, e.g., McCabe, supra note 46, at 48 (noting that even after research and
development, only one in five thousand pharmaceutical products will ever reach the market).
177. Jacoby & Weiss, supra note 131, at 101-08.
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communities. Hence, PGRs would be treated much like oil, timber and
minerals. Under their proposed scheme, indigenous communities would
register their knowledge in an international databank. A multinational
wishing to use a PGR in the development of an end product would consult
the registry. If the PGR had been registered, the corporation would have to
pay for the use of the PGR.
While theoretically appealing, this proposal is unconvincing for several
reasons, many of which have already been discussed. First, under this
model, the initial entity to register the germplasm would hold the property
right. It is not clear whether an individual, group of individuals, or the
indigenous community as a whole, should register the PGR. This is
particularly problematic when a plant is known to a large group of people
but is registered by one of those individuals to the exclusion of the others.
Second, the transaction costs discussed above would still plague this
arrangement. Third, Jacoby and Weiss do not explain how "fair rates"
would be negotiated between the multinationals and the communities.
Therefore, the problems associated with Coasean contracts would not
necessarily be circumvented by this scheme. Fourth, the proposal does not
encourage conservation. The reasons articulated above for why granting
indigenous communities IPRs would not encourage them to conserve are
equally applicable here.
Finally, the scheme is troubling because it purports to circumvent the
State. As this paper has argued in several places, this maneuver is
counterproductive. If conservation is to replace consumption, it is
imperative that States collect rents from conservation. While the support of
indigenous communities is an essential component of successful
conservation efforts, circumventing the State will not ensure that the
governments will prefer conservation strategies. Ultimately, decisions
such as whether or not a large logging company can log a portion of a
forest, are decisions that are made by the State. If the governments cede to
loggers and subsequently allow industries to develop the cleared land,
they can collect rents-rents that they cannot collect when they are
circumvented by policies that grant property rights, intellectual or
otherwise, to indigenous people. Aside from this purely economic
argument, policies that circumvent the State could potentially anger
leaders of LDCs and ultimately frustrate other conservation efforts.
D. Back to the FAO Undertaking
Another thesis that has been forwarded by many scholars would
return the international regime to the principles of the original FAO
Undertaking and eliminate all IPRs in PGRs and any products derived
from them. 8 There are several reasons why this approach is inferior. The
most important of which are that (1) it would be nearly impossible to
achieve politically, (2) it would create a tremendous disincentive to
178. See, e gS SHWA, snn note 96, at1-4.
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research and develop end-products, 79 and (3) since no one would profit
from conservation, it would fail to provide LDCs an economic incentive to
conserve. While these theorists have offered many compelling normative
arguments for their proposals, such as the need to undo the"commodification of life," the purpose of this Note is to think creatively
about possible solutions in the context of politics, and not to imagine the
most idealistic or utopian world and then describe it.
E. Incrementalism
The last general category of proposals that I wish to consider are ones
that do not involve large-scale restructuring, but rather more incremental
changes within the current international legal regime. While each proposal
has some merit, none of them alone, or in combination, would be superior
to the IBPO model.
One proposal that has been forwarded is price controls, which would
allow LDCs to set price limits on patented products.ln Price controls are
problematic because there would be no standardized way to determine
what the price for a product should be. Therefore, LDCs may set the price
too low thereby nullifying the effect of patent protections. As a
consequence, DCs would be highly unlikely to agree to a scheme in which
LDCs would be allowed to independently price products for sale within
their own borders. Additionally, corporations may simply choose not to
export the product at that price.81
Another proposal would enact a compulsory licensing scheme. A
compulsory licensing system is one in which a corporation is forced to
license their patented product to a corporation within another country that
will then sell the product in that country while sharing some of its profits
with the parent company. While compulsory licensing is within the scope
of TRIPs, there are severe restrictions on the LDCs' use of such licensing.82
Even if these could be relaxed in an amendment to TRIPs, the problem of
who determines the terms of the license becomes a barrier to feasibility. In
addition, part of the thrust for TRIPs was the effort to limit compulsory
licensing schemes; thus, it would be very difficult to get DCs to agree to
this proposal.
Another proposal, one which I argue should eventually be
incorporated into the IBPO treaty, is a "work the patent" rule.'83 This rule
179. See, e.g., McCabe, supra note 46, at 65-7; Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International
Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
465, 470 (1994).
180. See, e.g., McCabe, supra note 46 at 60; Weissman, supra note 44, at 1074.
181. See, e.g., Ileana Dominguez-Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical
Research and Human Rights: The Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL INT'L.L.J., 245, 247 n.8
(1997).
182. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 35, art. 31.
183. See, e.g., Ritchie, supra note 101, at 439 (noting that 80% of patents in Third World
countries are owned by foreigners and of those 95% are not utilized in the countries).
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would require corporations to market and sell the patented product in a
country in order to maintain patent protection in that country. This
prevents the situation where a company develops a socially beneficial
product, gains a patent in a country, and then does not, for any number of
reasons, market and sell the products in that country. A work the patent
rule would force the company to either make the products available for
sale or to allow its patent to expire.' 84
F. Summation
In summary, the IBPO is a superior model to those discussed in the
literature to this date. Proposals such as Coasean contracts and creating
IPRs in PGRs contemplate property rights regimes that would transform
PGRs from public goods to private goods. While each model has its
particular difficulties, there are two overarching problems that are
applicable to each of the proposals. First, treating PGRs as private
property requires the system to identify an individual owner. Even if this
hurdle is overcome, a second remains-if a PGR becomes a private good
owned by an entity A, the entity B that wants to produce an end product
using the PGR has to purchase that good from A. While theoretically
appealing, the outcomes will be skewed in favor of DCs because these
deals will be struck in a market in which B will have tremendous leverage
over A and will therefore be able to purchase the rights to the PGRs at
prices that will not reflect the level of investment made by LDCs. The
IBPO serves as a "middle man" that ensures that a fair price8 is set. It does
so by treating PGRs as LCP rather than pure private property. Proposals
that advocate dismantling the entire system of intellectual property, on the
other hand, are not pragmatic solutions to a pressing problem that
deserves more structural scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE IBPO IN NORMATIE CONTEXT
I began in the introduction and in Part I by noting that there were two
ways in which to answer the macro-question, "Why change?"-a
normative answer and a positive answer. I concluded Part I by arguing
that the serious policy proposals that seek to alter fundamental aspects of
the status-quo regime must provide more than normative justifications. It
is my hope that this Note has provided both. Before concluding, I want to
return briefly to the human rights and development concerns raised
explicitly at the onset and alluded to throughout the Note.
Given the growth of "knowledge-based" industries, the current
184. The reason why this proposal is limited has to do directly with its enforceability. A
corporation could market and sell a product at a high price to a small segment of the
population. Ways in which to control these abuses are beyond the scope of this paper.
185. The fair price is meant to refer to the price that would promote the most efficient
ncitcnmP.._ rpp.upra Part M.
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international IP regime has potentially broad implications for human rights
in developing countries. The question that this Note has attempted to
address is: What is the best way to approach these issues? In other words,
what can be done to negotiate a solution that maximizes the development
prospects of the LDCs, and at the same time protects the development
concerns of LDCs and prevents the violation of the human rights of
indigenous communities? The attempt has been made with the assumption
that simply pointing out the normative flaws of the positions taken by the
DCs and arguing that their advocates should completely abandon the
current IP regime is unrealistic.
The IBPO is my solution to this pressing problem. It is my aspiration
that it will engender fruitful thought and discussion both in scholastic and
policy circles. One might challenge the proposal by suggesting that it is
not sufficiently "liberal" and does not go far enough. Perhaps that point is
valid. Some may argue that the only satisfactory normative solution to the
situation is for the current regime to be completely replaced. While I agree
that those challenges and critiques do shed light on past and present
injustices, in putting my pragmatic pen to this endeavor it is not my
purpose to reject those critiques, but rather to incorporate them within a
conception of a viable structural proposal.
The IBPO system modifies the status quo by recognizing the property
rights of both DCs and LDCs. From a normative perspective, the IBPO says
to the nations of the LDC:
The conservation of environmental habitats is central
to the continued production of global public goods such as
oxygen. Additionally, PGRs are valuable resources that
will help produce many commercial end-products. The
conservation of these resources and the knowledge of
indigenous communities are vital to the continued
production of end-products and to our survival as a
species. Therefore, the rents we collect from the
commercial sale of these products will be shared with you.
This system is not based on charity but as recognition for
your investment and the principle that you should not have
to bear the entire burden of subsidizing global public
goods necessary for human survival.
Most scholars and policy makers that have attempted to devise
solutions to the problem of PGRs have missed this "compromise solution."
Instead, they have generally proposed systems that replace the current
regime with a system in which PGRs are treated as private goods. This
paper has attempted to prove the shortcomings of this approach. I have
suggested that a new model needs to be developed treating PGRs as
limited common property. This new international regime would be
administered by an International Biotechnology Patent Office. This office
would be responsible for allocating all patents, worldwide, for end-
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products derived from PGRs. By centralizing the function of granting
IPRs, the model allows a condition to be placed on the patent; namely that
LDCs must be compensated for their investment into the end-product.
Thus, this model allows both the property rights of the DCs and LDCs to
be recognized.
The failure to act with pragmatic solutions will result in the continued
destruction of habitats, the uncompensated use of indigenous knowledge
and escalating tensions between DCs and LDCs. It is, however, in the
interests of both groups to reorient their stances. The goal of this Note has
been to propose an alternative with the aspiration of proving that it is both
tenable and normatively superior. Adopting it will certainly take political
will and courage. Hopefully, leaders of DCs will have the fortitude to
realize that the long-term security of the ecosystem, the human rights of
indigenous communities and the development of LDCs are also
worthwhile goals.
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